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INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is
a check on government action restricting the use and enjoyment of private property.1
But before a plaintiff can trigger its provisions, the various requirements of the Clause
must be satisfied. The text of the Clause is deceptively simple: “[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”2 Courts have interpreted
this language to require that several threshold conditions be present before a litigant
can obtain relief under the Clause.3
One important, but often overlooked, precondition to a successful takings claim is
that the government-defendant must be the entity that caused the harm to the property
1 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 See infra Part I. In Part I, we will discuss the most commonly litigated threshold require-
ments for bringing a legally cognizable takings challenge.
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owner.4 The law surrounding this causation requirement, though commonly litigated,
is unsettled and therefore uncertain. This confusion is due in part to the causation
issues, which may arise in no less than five different factual contexts, that have a bear-
ing on whether a takings claim can be brought at all against a particular defendant.
This Article will focus primarily on the first factual variant, which occurs when there
is some nexus, but not necessarily a sufficient one, between the government-defendant’s
action and the taking of the plaintiff owner’s property.5 The question of “causation” be-
comes particularly difficult and complicated in this situation because the government-
defendant has, in fact, had some causative connection to the plaintiff’s injury, but that
connection may not necessarily be enough. The issue for the court to resolve is whether
that connection and causative link are substantial enough to establish sufficient causa-
tion for the defendant to be the proper subject of a takings claim.
The other four factual variants that arise in the case law seem to have their own
tests for whether the government-defendant named in the lawsuit is the proper
defendant. Those remaining variants occur in four situations: (1) when actions by
private parties, taken pursuant to state or federal law, damage the plaintiff’s private
property;6 (2) when the plaintiff–property owner, not the defendant, is the true cause
of the taking;7 (3) when the taking of the property has been caused by normal market
forces or acts of nature;8 and finally, (4) when the taking has been caused by some
third party who is not the government-defendant.9
Within each of the five factual contexts, courts have struggled to define what is re-
quired to prove a causative link between the plaintiff’s harm and the named defendant.10
The judicial tests seem to vary by jurisdiction and according to the particular facts at
issue.11 These tests range from requirements that are unique to takings challenges,
to tests that mirror traditional tort-like requirements for causation, to takings-torts
hybrids.12 The courts seem to adopt the widest range of differing approaches to the
causation issue when they are faced with the first factual variant, in which all agree
there has been some government involvement, and when the inquiry revolves around
whether causation tests adopted in tort law should play a role in a takings case.13 In
4 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Comm’r of Ins., 84 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding no taking
when there was no “causal connection between the statute facially attacked and the [insurance]
rates claimed to be confiscatory [by the plaintiff]”).
5 See, e.g., Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 250 P.3d 7, 8–9 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (determining
whether the city’s cleaning of sewer lines for the public benefit, but which resulted in damage
to the plaintiff’s house, amounted to a taking).
6 See infra Part II.B.1.
7 See infra Part II.B.2.
8 See infra Part II.B.3.
9 See infra Part II.B.4.
10 See infra Parts III–IV.
11 See infra Parts III–IV.
12 See infra Parts III–IV.
13 See infra Part III.
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this situation, courts have used all manner of different combinations of intent, cause
in fact, and proximate cause requirements to decide the causation question.14
For example, in Dunn v. City of Milwaukie,15 a state court takings case, the central
issue was not whether the plaintiff had been injured or whether the injury constituted
an uncompensated taking.16 Rather, the issue was whether the government-defendant
had intended to cause the plaintiff’s injury.17 To answer this question, the court wrestled
with the problem of deciding whether the causation requirement should be addressed
using a torts test or a pure takings test.18 The plaintiff in Dunn sought “compensation
for damage to her home resulting from raw sewage that backed up through bathroom
fixtures when the city ‘hydrocleaned’ a nearby sewer line.”19 The defendant argued
that no taking occurred because the plaintiff presented no evidence that the city had
intended the harm.20 Although the court maintained that intent was a necessary ele-
ment to finding a taking, it ultimately found that the Takings Clause was violated.21
What was critical to this result was “whether ‘there is evidence’ that the sewage
intrusion was the natural and ordinary consequence of the city’s hydrocleaning.”22
Even though the sewage intrusion was not a usual result of routine hydrocleaning,
it was not an unnatural or extraordinary event, and it did not involve any intervening
cause.23 Therefore, the city was responsible for, and had caused, the plaintiff’s injury.24
This analysis suggests that, in the absence of intent, some courts will apply a tort-like
proximate cause test to determine whether there is a sufficient causative link between
the government action and the plaintiff’s harm.
Other courts, however, refuse to rely on tort-like concepts to find causation in a
takings action. For example, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States,25
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to find the Takings
Clause violated by government-induced flooding that resulted in substantial and per-
manent damage to trees on the plaintiff’s land.26 The Federal Circuit concluded that
the action should be brought as a tort rather than as a taking, because “[a]n injury that
is only ‘in its nature indirect and consequential,’ i.e. a tort, cannot be a taking.”27 This
statement suggests that the court was using a test for causation in a takings case that
14 See infra Part III.
15 250 P.3d 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
16 See id. at 8–10.
17 Id. at 10.
18 Id. at 9–11, 13.
19 Id. at 8.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 13.
22 Id. at 10 (quoting Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 56 P.3d 396, 402 (Or. 2002)).
23 Id. at 11.
24 Id. at 11, 13.
25 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
26 Id. at 1367.
27 Id. at 1374 (quoting Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924)).
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is different from a torts test, and that the distinction between an action that lies in tort
rather than takings could actually turn on the sort of causation the court finds. If the
Federal Circuit had found that the harm was a direct result of the government action,
it may have held that the higher causation threshold for a taking had been satisfied.
In this Article, we will focus on this first factual variant, involving direct gov-
ernment action that may not be sufficient to trigger the Takings Clause, but instead
may be considered tortious. This is the issue squarely before the courts in the Dunn
and Arkansas cases.28 We will examine this particular issue, as well as the larger issue
of takings and causation, in five Parts. Part I takes up the question of how and why the
issue of causation is so prevalent, yet so often ignored, in cases in which the plaintiff–
property owner is seeking Fifth Amendment “just compensation” from a government
actor. Because a Fifth Amendment takings claim is a constitutional challenge to an act
by the government, the state action doctrine is triggered.29 Part I will therefore examine
how the question of causation in a takings case is linked also to the Supreme Court’s
requirement that constitutional guarantees apply only to harms induced or compelled
by non-private, government-defendant decisions.
Part II considers and contrasts the five types of factual settings that give rise to
the causation issue in takings claims. Part III reviews and analyzes how courts have
resolved the causation question for the first, often-litigated factual variant, for which
there is no judicial consensus. In Part IV, we take up how the courts have resolved the
causation issue when (1) the government-defendant has only authorized private action
that harms the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff itself may be the source of the plaintiff’s harm,
(3) the plaintiff’s harm appears to be due to “Acts of God” or market forces, and (4) the
plaintiff’s harm may be because of some party other than the government defendant.
In Part V, we propose a more unifying theme for causation that can be applied to all
five factual variants, which will be largely drawn from our analysis of the first.
I. DID THE DEFENDANT CAUSE THE PLAINTIFF’S HARM? AN OVERLOOKED
THRESHOLD ISSUE WHEN BRINGING A TAKINGS CLAUSE CLAIM
A governmental “taking” can be understood simply as an exercise of the power
of property confiscation, or eminent domain power, that is held by the federal and state
governments of the United States.30 The federal power to take is not explicitly conferred
28 See id. (stating the issue as whether the government action was sufficient to constitute
a taking); Dunn, 250 P.3d at 10.
29 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (“[C]onstitutional standards are invoked
only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plain-
tiff complains.”); see, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (“New York
is in no way responsible for [the warehouseman’s] decision, a decision which the State . . .
permits but does not compel . . . .”).
30 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (describing the
Takings Clause as restricting the government’s power to take private property).
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by the Constitution, but it is presumed because the Fifth Amendment provides a
remedy—just compensation—when such power is exercised.31 Most state constitutions
explicitly confer eminent domain power, along with a remedy of just compensation.32
This just compensation relief exists regardless of whether the law-making body in-
tended to take private property.33 “The taking power is certainly being deployed in the
case of intentional takings, when the government formally condemns private property
by an exercise of eminent domain.”34 The courts must also determine if an uncompen-
sated taking has occurred “when a government action unintentionally takes private
property through an exercise of some other power, such as the police power. Irrespec-
tive of whether the taking is intentional or unintentional, the constitutional remedy for
the private property owner is the same—just compensation.”35
This Article will not address formal condemnations of property through use of the
eminent domain power, as causation issues typically do not arise when the government
formally states its intention to take private property for a public use.36 In such cases, the
dispute is generally about the adequacy of the compensation.37 Instead, we will focus
entirely on takings claims that arise when the government intends to act, but does not
intend to exercise eminent domain. Such claims, termed inverse condemnation or regu-
latory taking claims, are triggered when some government action—initiated without an
intention to formally exercise the power of eminent domain—seems to result in harm
to private property that is equivalent to eminent domain being exercised.38 The injured
property owner then asserts that the government action has risen to the level of an
unconstitutional, uncompensated taking.39 Such takings claims arise in at least five
distinct factual contexts.
The scenarios that generate the most complicated questions of causation occur
when there is a nexus between the government action and the plaintiff’s harm, but
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32 For example, Iowa’s Constitution provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation first being made.” IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18. Washington’s
Constitution provides that “[n]o private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private
use without just compensation having been first made.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; see also
Harms v. City of Sibley, 702 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2005) (“Because the federal and state consti-
tutional provisions regarding takings are nearly identical, federal cases interpreting the federal
provision are persuasive in our interpretation of the state provision.”).
33 JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERN-




37 See id. at 8-16.
38 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[T]he natural tendency of human
nature is to extend [the police power] more and more until at last private property disappears. . . .
[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking.”).
39 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 8-18 to -19.
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that nexus may not be substantial enough to require the government-defendant to be
deemed responsible for an unconstitutional taking.40 The question for the reviewing
courts, and for this Article, is when is some government involvement in the plaintiff’s
injury sufficient to become a taking, and when is it not? And if it is not sufficient to
become a taking, might it nonetheless be a tort? And do the answers to these questions
also dispose of the other four factual variants involving causation?
Under each of the five factual variants involving causation, when a property owner
has an interest in property that appears injured by the government, one recourse is to
assert that the government has taken that interest without just compensation.41 For such
a takings claim, the issue of causation arises twice. First, the plaintiff must select from
the several merit-based tests available to courts that are applied to takings cases, and
decide if the facts of the plaintiff’s injury fit best into one, or several, of these standards
for determining whether a taking has occurred.42 For each test of whether the claim has
substantive merit under the Takings Clause, the element of causation must be alleged.43
The plaintiff must state in its complaint that the government-defendant was respon-
sible for action that satisfies one of the standard tests under the Takings Clause.44
Second, before addressing the merits, the plaintiff must allege—and ultimately prove
as a threshold condition—that there is a sufficient causal connection between the
plaintiff’s injury and the named defendant.45 These two allegations about causation—
one going to the merits of the taking claim and one addressing a threshold condition—
are not the same.
A. The Merits—Did the Defendant’s Action Cause an Injury to the Plaintiff that
Satisfies One of the Tests Under the Takings Clause?
The government does not have to initiate formal eminent domain proceedings
to effect a taking for which just compensation is required.46 A taking can occur when
some exercise of government power in effect “takes” private property without provid-
ing just compensation.47 The Supreme Court and lower courts have, over time, iden-
tified the types of government impacts on private property that give rise to arguable
takings claims.48
40 Id. at 10-48.7 to .8.
41 Id. at 10-48.8.




46 Id. at 8-15.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394–95 (1994) (holding that a dedication
requirement failed to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the dedication and the
impact of the proposed use of property); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019
(1992) (finding that total takings are compensable); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–17
1188 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1181
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,49 the Supreme Court confirmed that in a non-
eminent domain situation, when the government has not declared its intention to
confiscate private property, a plaintiff seeking to bring a takings challenge against
a government regulation may proceed only under one of four theories.50 The first two
theories, “physical takings” and “total regulatory takings,” both address categories
of regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment.51 Regulatory takings challenges that fall “[o]utside these two rel-
atively narrow categories” are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.52 Additionally, as a final form of regulatory
challenge, a plaintiff may allege an uncompensated taking when a land-use exaction
violates the standards set out in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission53 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard.54
1. Physical Takings
If government action or regulation causes private property to be physically
occupied, the regulation is a categorical per se taking regardless of the reason for the
occupation or the impact on the owner.55 A per se taking of private property requires
a permanent physical occupation or invasion, not simply a restriction on the use of
the property.56 “Permanent does not mean forever.”57 Rather, it involves substantial
physical intrusion of the property.58 Moreover, the occupation does not need to be
(1987) (finding that a law abolishing the right of descent and devise was a taking of an essential
property right); Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that at
a minimum, government action must have destroyed, physically occupied, or excessively regu-
lated plaintiff’s property for a takings claim to be stated); Richardson v. Cox, 26 P.3d 970,
976 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that construction of a public road across plaintiff’s land is
a per se physical invasion taking absent a dedication of an easement by plaintiffs).
49 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
50 See id. at 538–40.
51 Id. at 538.
52 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–40.
53 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987).
54 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).
55 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(finding that an ordinance requiring landlords to install a cable box and wires in apartment
building is a per se taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (finding
the same for the imposition of navigational servitude).
56 See, e.g., Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding
no per se physical taking because the statute amendments applied to all property owners, only
limited the use of their property, and did not require property owners to deed portions of their
properties to the state for public use).
57 Otay Mesa Prop. L.P. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 774, 786 (2009) (quoting Hendler v.
United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58 Id.
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exclusive or continuous to constitute a taking.59 Causation is relevant for physical
takings because a court must first determine if the defendant, or some other entity, was
responsible for the invasion, and second whether the physical invasion is substantial
enough to constitute a per se taking.60
2. Total Takings
A “total regulatory taking[ ]” is the second form of per se taking that the Supreme
Court has recognized.61 If there has in fact been a total taking, this is the easiest case for
a court to consider, but it is the most difficult kind of case for a plaintiff to prove. A
regulation that denies an owner all economically viable use of property affected by
the regulation is considered a categorical or “total” taking of the use value of that prop-
erty interest.62 The case that confirmed this rule is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.63 In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that when regulations deprive an owner
of “all economically beneficial use” of the property, the government must pay just
compensation, except to the extent that “background principles of nuisance and prop-
erty law” apply.64 The Court’s viewpoint is that the total deprivation of beneficial
use is—from the property owner’s point of view—equivalent to a physical invasion,
which itself is a per se taking.65 A plaintiff alleging a total taking must show that the
defendant—a government actor—was responsible for the loss, and that the loss was
a deprivation of all beneficial and viable use of the property.66
3. Regulatory Takings
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized a type of unintentional taking that
is a regulatory, rather than physical, interference.67 These are known as regulatory
takings,68 and they occur when a law, ostensibly adopted under the police power, takes
property by action “other than acquisition of title, occupancy, or physical invasion.”69
59 Id. (citing Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1377).
60 Id.
61 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (citation omitted).
62 Id. at 538.
63 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
64 Id. at 1029–30.
65 Id. at 1017.
66 See id. at 1016 n.6.
67 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 516 (1987) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
68 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS
3 (1996); Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings and
Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 571–73 (2003).
69 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 123 n.25 (1978)
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The kind of government action that causes a regulatory taking is an action seeking to
restrict or limit the owner’s use of property.70 Such actions typically diminish, but do
not entirely wipe out, the economic value of the property.71 In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,72 Justice Holmes stated that a regulatory law may be intended to be an exer-
cise of the police power, but if a court believes the police power “reaches a certain
magnitude” and thereby “goes too far,”73 the regulation will have “gone beyond its
constitutional power” and become a taking.74
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court set out the modern test for when a regulation’s
economic impact on private property constitutes a taking.75 The Penn Central Court
decided that the “economic impact” of the law in question was only one of three “ad
hoc, factual inquiries” that had particular significance to the takings determination.76
The other two consider the “character of the governmental action” and its interference
with the plaintiff’s “investment-backed expectations.”77 The Penn Central decision
acknowledges that economic impact has relevance to takings claims, but “reject[s] the
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’”78
In Lingle and other cases, the Supreme Court suggested that the Penn Central multi-
factor balancing test should be the default test in most takings cases.79 Consistent with
the Penn Central test, then, the plaintiff must prove that the government-defendant
both caused the loss of economic value and caused the interference with investment-
backed expectations.
(“[W]e do not embrace the proposition that a ‘taking’ can never occur unless government has
transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel.”); Fruman v. City of Detroit, 1 F. Supp.
2d 665, 676 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that a government entity operating under its police
powers can cause a taking).
70 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38 (2005).
71 See, e.g., Henry v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 637 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting
an argument that a regulatory taking occurred when county planning commission granted a
property owner permission to build only 14 townhouses, rather than the 51 units to which he
claimed he was entitled).
72 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
73 Id. at 413, 415.
74 Id. at 413.
75 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (acknowledging
the Penn Central test as the modern test for regulatory takings).
76 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
77 Id. at 124, 127.
78 Id. at 131.
79 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. In both Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), and
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002),
the Court embraced the Penn Central test, especially when the issue involved deciding whether
the government’s action should be characterized as a physical per se taking or a regulatory
taking. The Court in these cases evidenced a reluctance to find per se takings, opting instead
for the flexibility of the Penn Central regulatory takings test. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at
326–27; Palzzzolo, 533 U.S. at 635–36; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39.
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4. Land-Use Exactions
The final type of impact that may give rise to a takings action occurs when the gov-
ernment conditions land use on a dedication or transfer of private property interests.80
In Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme Court held that for such an “exaction” to be upheld,
there must be an essential nexus and reasonable relationship between the anticipated
effects of a land use and the real property exaction.81 In exaction cases, causation is
rarely an issue because the conditions on development being challenged are almost
always imposed by the government-defendant.82 A different causation question arises
in these cases: Did the proposed action by the property owner cause the problem that
the condition is designed to correct?83
B. Threshold Conditions in Takings Claims
Causation is also one of several threshold conditions that must be met before the
merits of a takings case will even be considered.84 These conditions arise either be-
cause they are mandated by the language of the Takings Clause or Article III,85 or
because the judiciary wants to avoid the task of deciding whether government action
constitutes an unconstitutional taking.86 If a threshold condition is not met, the court
can dismiss on that ground alone, without ever reaching the merits.87
The first such condition is that the interest affected by the action must be “private
property” within the Fifth Amendment.88 Second, the plaintiff must be capable of bring-
ing a takings claim.89 Third, the timing of the takings lawsuit must meet certain consti-
tutional standards, and the action must be brought in the proper forum.90 This condition
is a barrier to takings litigation when the case is brought too early, or when it is brought
in a federal court before state remedies have been exhausted.91 Finally, causation must
be present.92 As a threshold condition, causation requires that the defendant be a gov-
ernment actor responsible for the harm alleged to be the taking of the private prop-
erty interest.93
80 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
81 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
82 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
83 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380–81.





89 Id. at IV-1 to-2.
90 Id. at IV-4 to -5.
91 Id. at IV-5.
92 Id. at IV-2 to -3.
93 Id. at IV-3.
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1. Is the Interest Taken Considered “Property” Protected by the U.S. Constitution?
The protections of the Takings Clause apply only to interests that qualify as
“property.”94 For Fifth Amendment purposes, the concept of property is not limited
to real property or physical possessions; it can also include legal rights that are ap-
purtenant to other rights such as ownership.95 However, the Takings Clause does not
apply to property rights that have been either voluntarily relinquished by the plain-
tiff or extinguished by operation of law.96 The Takings Clause states that “private”
property shall not be taken, but courts have occasionally construed this language to
apply to federal actions that allegedly harm land owned by state and local govern-
ment entities.97 When the military destroys property that has been designated by the
executive branch as enemy war-making property,98 or when it freezes assets to prevent
their use to support international terrorism,99 the protections of the Fifth Amendment
will not be extended.100 Accordingly, regulatory measures that serve the interest of
national security may not be compensable takings even if they adversely affect indi-
vidual interests that have been deemed private property.101
2. Is the Plaintiff Capable of Initiating a Takings Action?
One important question is identifying who is a proper private party to initiate a
takings claim against the government. Although the right to compensation for a tak-
ing may extend beyond the actual property owner (whose property has been taken) to
those who have a legal status that runs with the land, a mere user or possessor of the
property typically cannot bring a taking claim.102 Moreover, nonresident aliens with
no voluntary or contractual relationship with the United States are also not entitled to
Fifth Amendment rights.103
94 Id. at IV-1.
95 Id. at IV-1 to -2, see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 156–57 (1998);
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–78 (1945).
96 LAITOS, supra note 33, at IV-1.
97 Id.
98 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 764 (2003).
99 See Paradissiotis v. United States, 304 F.3d 1271, 1275–76 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
100 LAITOS, supra note 33, at IV-1.
101 Id.
102 Layne v. City of Manderville, 743 So. 2d 1263, 1268 (La. Ct. App. 1999); see also
Johnson v. United States, 317 F.3d 1331, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The plaintiff must have
standing to bring a takings claim. See, e.g., Johnson, 317 F.3d at 1334 (“When a plaintiff
bring[s] an action on behalf of a corporation . . . but does not maintain shareholder status
throughout . . . the litigation, the plaintiff no longer has standing to bring the action.”).
103 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 782–84 (1950); Hoffman v. United States, 53
F. Supp. 2d 483, 490 (D.D.C. 1999).
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3. Timing and Appropriate Forum
The jurisdictional “case/controversy” requirement found in Article III applies
to takings claims.104 A court cannot review a claim that is moot because it is brought
too late, or that is not ripe because it is brought to early.105 Mootness issues in takings
claims are less frequent than ripeness issues, although a takings claim will be deemed
moot if it is time-barred by a statute of limitations.106 A takings lawsuit may be too
early when: (1) it is a facial attack on the validity of the allegedly harmful government
action, as opposed to an as-applied challenge, that must wait for the action to be applied
to the plaintiff’s property, or (2) the plaintiff brings the action before first exhausting
all possible remedies.107
“[F]or an ‘as applied’ challenge, a property owner must obtain a final decision
from the [local land-use authorities].”108 Finality may require that before the property
owner can claim that a regulatory restriction has taken the owner’s property, the owner
must make “at least one ‘meaningful application’” for a development permit under the
regulation.109 “[I]t may also be necessary to (1) apply for a variance if the application
is denied and (2) submit additional applications for other, less [ambitious or] intensive
uses of the property that the regulatory authority might find acceptable.”110
If the property owner is dissatisfied or experiencing an adverse economic result
because a relevant government entity has denied development or imposed restrictions
104 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-5 to -7.
105 Id.
106 Id.; see also Mildenberger v. United States, 63 F.3d 938, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Claims
for compensation under the Tucker Act . . . are subject to a strict statute of limitations
provision: ‘[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after the claim first
accrues.’”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d
1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 550 U.S. 968 (2007) (granting certiorari to the
limited question of whether the Tucker Act’s statute of limitations constitutes a clear
congressional statement of a limit of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims), aff’d, 552 U.S. 130 (2008) (“Without a restriction on the time for contesting
property development conditions, the government would be perpetually exposed to unlimited
takings challenges.”); Goodman v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 289, 306 (2011); Wilson v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Teton, 153 P.3d 917, 925 (Wyo. 2007).
107 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-10.
108 Id.; see also Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 186–94 (1985); Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(finding that if a permit denial is final, the takings claim based on denial is ripe).
109 See, e.g., Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1987); see also,
e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985); Burlington
N. R.R. Co. v. United States, 752 F.2d 627, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
110 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-13 (citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty.,
477 U.S. 340, 352–53 n.8 (1986)); see also Christensen v. Yolo Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
995 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir. 1993).
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on it—or if the owner is making a facial challenge—the plaintiff owner must exhaust
state remedies before seeking redress in federal court.111 This requirement means that
a plaintiff must “‘seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided
for doing so’ before turning to the federal courts.”112 If a party does not avail herself
of state procedures to attempt to obtain compensation, a federal takings claim usually
will not ripen.113 In Williamson County Regional Commission v. Hamilton Bank,114 the
Court held that a plaintiff cannot sue under the Fifth Amendment in federal court until
the plaintiff has exhausted “[s]tate . . . procedure[s] for seeking just compensation”
in state court.115
“Even if a state does not have a compensation remedy available as a matter of state
law, the United States Supreme Court has ensured that such a remedy is . . . available
[in state court] under federal law.”116 But if the plaintiff brings a takings case in state
court, a Fifth Amendment federal remedy in federal court may be unavailable.117 A pri-
vate property owner who follows the Hamilton Bank exhaust-state-remedies require-
ment by bringing the action first in state court risks that court deciding that the claim
is not a taking under state and federal takings law, in which case “res judicata and
claim preclusion may prevent the Fifth Amendment claim from being subsequently
argued in federal court.”118
4. Causation—Did the Plaintiff Sue the Correct Defendant?
Even if the claim is ripe, located in the proper court, and brought by the correct
plaintiff alleging harm to “property” under the Fifth Amendment, judicial review of
111 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 194–97.
112 Christensen, 995 F.2d at 164 (quoting Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi
Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1989)).
113 Key Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Galesburg, 327 F.3d 549, 550 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[S]tate and
federal takings claims are premature . . . because plaintiffs have not exhausted their remedies
under state law and thus have not established that the government is refusing to pay whatever
compensation may be required by the Constitution.”); Daniel v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 288
F.3d 375, 381 (9th Cir. 2002).
114 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
115 Id. at 195.
116 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-28; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (holding that because of the self-executing nature of
the Fifth Amendment, a state court may not refuse to award just compensation under federal
law when a taking is found).
117 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Pitkin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1324–25
(10th Cir. 1998).
118 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-29; see also San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
545 U.S. 323, 341, 346 (2005); Seven Up Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 950 (9th
Cir. 2008); Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1324–25 (10th Cir. 1998); Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 136
F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n. v. City of San Marcos,
989 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1993); Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1058–59,
1061 (11th Cir. 1987); Treister v. City of Miami, 893 F. Supp. 1057, 1071 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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the takings claim may be avoided if the government-defendant can successfully show
that it is not the entity responsible for causing the harm to the property owner.119 For
the Takings Clause to apply, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury that is the
subject of the claim was caused by the government-defendant, and not by someone or
something else, such as an act of nature.120 This threshold inquiry requires a determi-
nation of whether the defendant is the proper party for the plaintiff to sue, based on the
nexus between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s action.121
C. Problems with Causation as a Threshold Condition
The question of causation in a takings lawsuit is frequently overlooked by
plaintiff’s counsel, who too often assumes (or hopes) that the proper defendant is
a deep-pocketed government actor with some connection to the plaintiff’s injury.
However, this issue of the wrong defendant is commonly litigated, especially when the
government-defendant wishes to shift the blame elsewhere and when the government
in fact may not be responsible for a private party’s harm.122 Additionally, many litigants
do not adequately address the causation threshold requirement because courts have
not provided a consistent definition for what level of, or test for, causation applies.123
“The [general rule for causation] can be stated simply: In order to have a legally
cognizable takings claim, the property owner must demonstrate that the property has
been taken because of the action of the [government-defendant].”124 However, the
presence of causation is not always an objective determination. Causation issues be-
come complicated when the alleged harm is caused, either wholly or in part, by one or
more parties other than the government-defendant or when nature and market forces
contribute to the harm.125 In such situations, the judicial decisions often turn on policy
considerations.126 Courts’ differing interpretations of the purpose and meaning of the
Takings Clause can lead to contrasting decisions regarding causation.127 Until courts
clarify the analytical framework for deciding these issues, litigants must attempt to deci-
pher the multiple inconsistent decisions that address causation as a threshold condition
for takings claims.
119 LAITOS, supra note 33, at IV-2.
120 Id. at 10-48.9.
121 Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307,
321–22 (2007).
122 See LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.19.
123 Meltz, supra note 121, at 321.
124 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.6.
125 See Meltz, supra note 121, at 322–23; see also Jackson Court Condos. v. City of New
Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir. 1989).
126 See Jackson Court Condos., 874 F.2d at 1081.
127 See Meltz, supra note 121, at 321.
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1. Causation and the State Action Doctrine
The Takings Clause is written in the passive voice—“nor shall private property
be taken. . . .”128 As such, the language of the Clause does not reveal who, or what,
may not take private property without just compensation, nor does it reveal who is
responsible for paying just compensation in the event of a taking. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Clause to apply to actions by both the federal government129 and
instrumentalities of state governments.130 Therefore, to obtain relief under the Takings
Clause, a property owner who believes it has suffered an unconstitutional taking of
private property must (1) sue a state or federal entity, and (2) show that the govern-
ment entity is the cause of the harm to the property.131
Because federal takings challenges are brought under the Constitution,132 and
because the Takings Clause only applies to government-defendants,133 the state action
doctrine must be satisfied for all takings actions.134 The state action doctrine holds that
a constitutional challenge can be brought only when the conduct allegedly causing
the deprivation of a constitutional right is attributable to the government—either a
federal, state, or political subdivision.135 This general state action precondition to trig-
gering the protections of the Constitution overlaps with the Takings Clause’s causation
requirement;136 the lack of state action will entail the lack of takings causation.137 Both
concepts require the plaintiff to prove more than the existence of government action
affecting private property.138 They each involve consideration of whether there is a
sufficient link between the government action and the harm to the plaintiff, and
whether the government-defendant is responsible for that harm in its capacity as a
128 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
129 Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
130 Chi., B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897); Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska,
164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896).
131 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.5.
132 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
133 See Am. Bankers Mortg. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg., 75 F.3d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1996).
134 See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999) (observing that
state action must be present before plaintiffs can allege deprivation of a constitutional right).
135 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934–35 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 838 (1982).
136 Compare City of Dall. v. CKS Asset Mgmt., Inc., 345 S.W.3d 199, 203 (Tex. Ct. App.
2011) (finding that the City caused the harm, but there was no state action because it behaved in
the manner of a private party), with Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (finding that the government was acting in its official capacity, but did not cause the harm).
137 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358–59 (1974) (finding that Pennsylvania
was not the cause of the deprivation of property because a heavily regulated private utility
company was not sufficiently connected to the state to be considered a state actor).
138 See id. at 358 (holding that proving that a private company is under heavy state regulation
is not enough to show state action).
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state actor.139 If a government actor engages in conduct that does not necessitate use
of sovereign powers, the state action requirement may not be satisfied.140
To satisfy the standards of these two concepts, the plaintiff must show that the
government-defendant either intended to act in its sovereign capacity and caused the
taking, or that the defendant’s challenged actions created some legal compulsion result-
ing in the harm to the property.141 Legal compulsion becomes an issue when a plaintiff–
property owner alleges that the government-defendant compelled a private party to act
in a way that caused harm to the owner’s property.142 If the private party’s action is ap-
proved by the government—and if the government also encourages, coerces, induces,
demands, or in some way requires the private action—then the government can be
said to be the cause of the harm and is a proper defendant.143 Conversely, the Takings
Clause will not provide relief if the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a non-government
actor or some other factor that is not attributable to the government-defendant.144 The
question for both state action and the Takings Clause is whether the harm was inflicted
by the government-defendant, or someone (or something) else.
2. Causation and Torts
“Causation” is a fluid concept with a meaning that can differ depending on the
context in which it arises. The causation requirement in a takings challenge is similar
to problems of causation in torts, in which not all actions that might have some connec-
tion to an injury are considered proximate enough to be fairly attributed to a defendant
as a matter of common law policy.145 In torts, proximate cause is essentially a product
139 Id. at 354–59.
140 CKS Asset Mgmt., Inc., 345 S.W.3d at 203–04 (finding no state action when a government-
defendant acted “akin to a private citizen” in a dispute over property ownership) (citation
omitted); see also Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland Cnty., 714 S.E.2d 869, 877 (S.C. 2011)
(“To prevail in [an inverse condemnation action], a plaintiff must prove ‘an affirmative,
aggressive, and positive act’ by the government entity that caused the alleged damage to the
plaintiff’s property.” (citing WRB Ltd. P’ship v. Cnty. of Lexington, 630 S.E.2d 479, 481
(S.C. 2006))).
141 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992) (“The government effects a physical
taking only where it requires the landowner to submit.”); Greystone Hotel Co. v. City of N.Y.,
13 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
142 See, e.g., Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 187 (2d Cir. 2005).
143 Id.; see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 527.
144 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Soc. Servs. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989)
(rejecting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim when a private actor caused the harm and the state had
no duty to act).
145 See Hoover v. Pierce Cnty., 903 P.2d 464, 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (finding a Fifth
Amendment taking when the government damages property by artificially channeling surface
water, and distinguishing the case from government action that merely causes an increase in
surface water that damages property).
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of the underlying purpose and goals of tort law.146 If the harm is completely unex-
pected and unforeseeable, proximate cause may not be satisfied.147 An argument can
be made that, as torts and takings share a common origin in property rights, the poli-
cies that form the boundaries for proximate cause in tort law should also apply to
takings challenges.
Many torts causation concepts, however, such as enhanced risk of future harm,
joint and several liability, concurrent causes, and mass torts, arguably do not have a
place in takings jurisprudence. Moreover, different purposes underlie tort law and tak-
ings doctrine. The former is meant “to deter [private] conduct which has been identi-
fied as contrary to public policy and harmful to society,” and to make whole victims
of such conduct.148 The latter is to “bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole.”149 The overlap between torts and takings, along with their conceptual
differences, has required courts to decide which causation concepts should apply to
the two kinds of claims.
3. How to Determine Causation in a Takings Case
The legal issue to be resolved by courts considering causation in a takings case
is to try to determine who (or what) is the true cause of the harm suffered by the
plaintiff.150 This inquiry involves comparing the contribution of the government-
defendant to all other potential causative factors and weighing the substantiality of
their contributions to the plaintiff’s harm.151 Any supervening events that have an
effect on the plaintiff’s injury must be considered.152 Another consideration that may
have an effect on the judicial analysis of causation is the extent of the injury caused
by each contributing factor, especially when there are potentially multiple causes.153
Although plaintiffs bringing takings challenges often seem most impacted by
decreases in the worth of their property, such issues involving diminution in economic
value are secondary to the threshold question of causation.154 Questions regarding the
extent of an alleged decrease in value or imposition of additional costs will never be
146 Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 75–76 (1975).
147 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
148 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
149 United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
150 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.6.
151 See, e.g., Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that
there were too many other causal factors, making the connection too attenuated to sustain a
takings claim).
152 See, e.g., id.
153 See, e.g., Kau Kau Take Home No. 1 v. City of Wichita, 135 P.3d 1221, 1226 (Kan.
2006) (finding that the harm was actually caused by the negligence of the contractors and not
government action).
154 See Balough v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 995 P.2d 245, 266 (Alaska 2000).
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reached without a factual showing that the loss of value or additional cost is causally
related to the government action.155
The necessary causative link may be missing for a number of reasons. If the
government is acting as a market participant, the takings claim will fail because the
state action doctrine will not be satisfied.156 If a causative connection cannot be drawn
between the alleged taking and the government-defendant entity, if there was no
government compulsion, or if the owner’s harm is due to the voluntary participation
of the owner, the takings claim cannot go forward against the named government-
defendant.157 Additionally, the merits of the taking claim will not be considered if the
court finds that the plaintiff’s property injury has been caused by: (1) another private
party,158 (2) another government actor,159 (3) the plaintiff,160 or (4) acts of nature.161
Causation plays a particularly critical role when a plaintiff’s challenge to gov-
ernmental regulation is neither a categorical per se taking nor a taking caused by an
unconstitutional exaction, but is instead one of the more commonly occurring chal-
lenges to government actions recognized in Lingle as regulatory takings.162 Within this
context, the most difficult of the five factual causation variants is when the government-
defendant is involved in the impact to the plaintiff’s property, but that involvement
might be missing some elements necessary to trigger a takings challenge against that
defendant.163 This situation invokes the most disagreement among the courts.164 More-
over, resolving this difficult issue is a way to resolve the question of causation for all
the other factual variants.165
II. THE FIVE FACTUAL SETTINGS
The resolution of causation problems in takings claims requires courts to focus
narrowly on the particular facts at issue.166 In any claim for just compensation, the
155 Id.; see also Weber v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 990 P.2d 611, 616 (Alaska 1999).
156 Ultimate Sportsbar, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 540, 549 (2001); LAITOS, supra
note 33, at 10-48.5.
157 See, e.g., Weber, 990 P.2d at 616 (finding no causal connection between government
action and harm).
158 See, e.g., Sullivant v. City of Okla. City, 940 P.2d 220, 224 (Okla. 1997) (finding no
taking when police damaged property in hot pursuit of a criminal suspect).
159 See, e.g., Jackson Court Condos. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th
Cir. 1989) (finding that the market caused the harm).
160 See, e.g., FDIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 699 (5th Cir. 1991) (deciding that the plaintiff’s
failure to reduce his agreements to writing caused the harm).
161 See, e.g., Leeth v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467, 485 (1991) (finding that the harm was
caused by nature and not the Truman Dam).
162 544 U.S. 528, 539–40 (2005).
163 See LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.5 to .20.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting
“the fact-intensive nature of just compensation jurisprudence”).
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causation analysis begins with an understanding of how, historically, judges have
altered the tests that they use for causation according to the particular factual context
that give rise to specific claims.167 There are five types of factual situations in which
causation issues commonly arise.168
The first category consists of actions in which (1) the plaintiff alleges that a
government-defendant acted in a way that resulted in harm to private property, and
(2) the government-defendant concedes to having committed the act that the plaintiff
believes was the cause of its harm.169 Under these facts, the issue then becomes whether
the government-defendant’s conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s harm for the
purposes of a takings claim.170 A government-defendant’s action will constitute a legal
cause of a plaintiff’s harm only when there is a sufficient nexus between the govern-
ment act and the private harm.171 Consistent with the state action doctrine, every claim
brought under the Fifth Amendment must have a government actor as the defendant.172
The first category is characterized by the extent of involvement of that government
action with the plaintiff’s injury.173
The second factual category involves action taken by a private party pursuant
to government regulation that results in harm to a plaintiff–property owner.174 If one
were to consider the enactment of regulation to be “government action,” these facts
could theoretically fit into the first category. However, the second factual category is
different because of the contribution of the additional action by a private party.175 In
other words, the plaintiff is not alleging that government’s enactment of regulation in-
dependently caused the plaintiff–property owner’s harm. Rather, the plaintiff is arguing
that the government’s action caused the harm in concert with the action of some other
private party. As such, the court’s analysis must be adjusted to address the relation-
ship between the government regulation, a private party’s action taken pursuant to the
regulation, and the harm to the plaintiff–property owner.176
The third category implicates the plaintiff as the causative actor responsible for
the plaintiff’s harm.177 For this category, there may have been a government act, but
167 See Meltz, supra note 121, at 321–22.
168 See infra Part II.
169 See, e.g., Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 250 P.3d 7, 9–10 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that
the government was still the cause of the damage even though damage was unintended).
170 See, e.g., id. at 11 (finding that the government was the legal harm).
171 See. id. at 9.
172 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
173 See Dunn, 250 P.3d at 8.
174 Abdullah v. Comm’r of Ins., 84 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that the insurance
company acting pursuant to state insurance law was not a state actor).
175 Compare Dunn, 250 P.3d 7 (finding the government’s own sewage system caused the
harm), with Abdullah, 84 F.3d at 22 (finding harm was caused by insurance company applying
insurance law).
176 See Abdullah, 84 F.3d at 22.
177 See, e.g., FDIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 699 (5th Cir. 1991).
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the plaintiff’s own decisions may have been responsible for the injury.178 The fourth
category fingers nature, or some economic system, as the true source of the plaintiff’s
problems.179 The government-defendant is thought to play a de minimus role.180 The
final category considers whether the blame should be placed on some third party, not
the government-defendant.181 As with the other categories, the government-defendant
may have taken an action but the plaintiff’s harm seems more traceable to the action
of someone else.182
A. Government Involved, but Involved Enough?
When government action indirectly damages private property, a plaintiff may bring
a takings claim for just compensation.183 A government-defendant wishing to avoid
a plaintiff’s takings claim may argue that the harm resulting from its action was not
intended, not foreseeable, or not a direct result of the action.184 One consequence of
this defense is that the claim should be brought as a tort rather than as a taking.185 The
issue in such cases is not whether the government committed the action, but whether,
as a matter of causation, the government should be held responsible for the conse-
quences of that action.186
For example, in Dunn v. Milwaukie, the government-defendant did not dispute that
it conducted hydrocleaning of sewer lines, which resulted in harm to the plaintiff’s
private property.187 Instead, causation became an issue when the government-defendant
alleged that the plaintiff’s claim for just compensation failed because the government
did not intend to cause intrusion of sewage and odor into the plaintiff’s home, and
because the harm was not a usual result of hydrocleaning.188 Similarly, in Arkansas
Game & Fish Commission v. United States, a case involving flooding and destruc-
tion of private property allegedly caused by a dam that was built by the government-
defendant, the government-defendant did not dispute that it built the dam.189 Instead,
it argued that the claim sounded in tort, and thus the Federal Claims Court had no
jurisdiction over it.190 The crux of the government-defendant’s argument in Arkansas
178 See, e.g., id.
179 See, e.g., Leeth v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467, 485 (1991).
180 See, e.g., id.
181 See, e.g., Sullivant v. City of Okla. City, 940 P.2d 220, 224 (Okla. 1997).
182 See, e.g., Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422, 429 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
Monsanto had not been conferred the powers of eminent domain).
183 See, e.g., Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 250 P.3d 7, 9–10 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
184 See, e.g., id.
185 See infra note 249.
186 Id.
187 250 P.3d at 9.
188 Id.
189 637 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
190 Id. at 1376.
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was that even if the alleged harm did result from government action, the damages
to the plaintiff’s property were merely consequential and thus did not give rise to an
action under the Takings Clause.191
Barnes v. United States192 and Moden v. United States193 are two additional cases
with facts falling within the first factual category. In Barnes, the plaintiff alleged that
a dam, built by the government in an effort to control the flood of a river, resulted in
the flooding of adjacent privately owned land.194 In Moden, the plaintiff alleged that a
harmful chemical leaked from an Air Force base onto the plaintiff’s nearby property,
causing extensive damage that amounted to a taking.195 As in Dunn and Arkansas,
the defendants in these cases conceded to having committed the act, but contested the
existence of the necessary nexus between that act and the harm experienced by the
plaintiff–property owner.196
Also included in this first factual category are takings claims in which the plaintiff
alleges that the government caused harm by entering into an international agreement.197
Actions taken by the legislative and executive branches of the United States govern-
ment for foreign policy reasons can occasionally harm private domestic entities.198 The
private entities that have experienced such negative economic impacts may advance
the theory that they have suffered an unconstitutional taking caused by the federal
government’s manipulation of the relevant market.199 The success of such a claim,
however, turns on the question of who, or what, really caused the plaintiff’s harm.200
Apart from the United States, there are three other sources often identified as
being responsible for the plaintiff’s harm. In each of these three alternative explanations
for the plaintiff’s harm, the United States concedes its complicity in the international
agreement.201 “A reviewing court might ask if the plaintiff’s own actions have in some
way produced the harm it is experiencing.”202 Second, “[t]he United States may try to
show that it should not be made to pay compensation under the Fifth Amendment when
the taking was actually caused by foreign actors.”203 Third, the federal government may
assert that any adverse effect on American parties was due to the economic market,
not the treaty or agreement.204
191 Id. at 1373.
192 538 F.2d 865 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
193 404 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
194 Barnes, 538 F.2d at 870.
195 Moden, 404 F.3d at 1338.
196 Id. at 1342–43; Barnes, 538 F.2d at 872.
197 See LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.20 to .22.
198 Id. at 10-48.20.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See generally id. at 10-48.20 to .22.
202 Id. at 10-48.21 (citing McKay v. United States, 199 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
203 Id. (citing Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 1995);
Huther v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 916 (Ct. Cl. 1956)).
204 Id. (citing Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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B. The Other Four Factual Settings
1. Actions by Private Parties, Taken Pursuant to State or Federal Law, that
Damage Private Property
Sometimes private action is tantamount to a government taking, even though a
private party accomplished the actual taking.205 However, “[a]s a general proposition,”
under the state action doctrine, “an action simply taken pursuant to state or federal
statute that affects a private party” is not attributable to the government for the pur-
poses of a “constitutional challenge to the action. The same rule applies with respect to
the Takings Clause: The fact that the conduct that harms a property owner is autho-
rized by federal or state law does not necessarily mean that the conduct is government
action under the Fifth Amendment.”206
For example, in Abdullah v. Commissioner of Insurance of Massachusetts, the
central issue was whether actions by a third party insurance company, taken pursu-
ant to state insurance law, gave rise to a takings claim against the state.207 Similarly,
the plaintiffs in Harms v. City of Sibley claimed that a city’s action in rezoning a
business property to allow for construction and operation of a cement mixing plant
was the true cause of harm to their property.208 The reviewing court had to determine
whether it was the city’s action in rezoning the property or the third party’s con-
struction and operation of the plant pursuant to the rezoning that resulted in the harm
to the plaintiff.209
205 Id. at 10-48.7 (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992); Richards v.
Wash. Terminal, 233 U.S. 546 (1913); Flagg v. Yonkers Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178
(2d Cir. 2005)).
206 Id. at 10-48.6 to .7; see B & G Enters., Ltd. v. United States, 220 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (holding that a federal statute conditioning receipt of funds by the state on the
limitation of tobacco sales did not directly restrict the placement of cigarette vending machines
and therefore did not constitute a taking); Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 431 (9th Cir.
1996); Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986);
Casa de Cambio Comdiv S.A. de C.V. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 137, 142 (2000) (holding
that Treasury’s likely expectation that a private party would debit plaintiff’s account did not
make that debiting an act of the Treasury under the Takings clause); Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins.
Co. of Vt., 144 F. Supp. 2d 291, 303 (D. Vt. 2001) (holding that a decision made by an insur-
ance company to reorganize, based on state reorganization statute, did not involve state action);
see also Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978) (holding that a warehouse
owner’s proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for storage to execute a lien under state
statute did not constitute state action). See generally J. David Beemer, The Evolution of the
“Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dollan and
Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 375–76 (2002).
207 84 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1996).
208 702 N.W.2d 91, 101 (Iowa 2005).
209 See id. at 96.
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As Abdullah and Harms illustrate, an action as simple as the enactment of a zoning
law could potentially result in a takings claim being alleged against the government.210
Therefore, when a plaintiff claims that the government should be held responsible for
actions of third parties taken pursuant to a law, it is necessary to undertake a careful
analysis of the relationship between the government-defendant’s law and the third
party’s action. For example, Navajo Nation v. United States211 involved a “mutual
consent” requirement that was imposed by the United States Department of Interior
on two Indian tribes that shared joint and undivided interests in the same land.212 The
requirement, which mandated that the Hopi and the Navajo tribes obtain each other’s
written consent before undertaking development projects in the region, was later codi-
fied by Congress.213 Thereafter, the Hopi imposed a moratorium on all further Navajo
construction activities.214 When the Navajo tribe filed a claim against the United States
government for just compensation, “[it] argued that the mutual consent requirement
‘constitute[d] a continuing taking of [its] property without just compensation and
violate[d] the trust responsibility owed by [the United States] to the [Navajo Nation]
as an Indian Tribe.’”215 The issue to be decided by the Federal Circuit was whether the
government’s codification of the mutual consent requirement had caused the harm to
the plaintiff for purposes of a takings action.216
When a takings suit involves some action by a state-run third party taken pursuant
to federal authorization, the federal government-defendant may argue that because the
state acquired the interest first, the federal government had only acted consistently
with the pre-existing state’s interest and therefore was not responsible for the private
injury.217 This was the defense offered by the United States Army Corps in National
Food & Beverage Co. v. United States.218 There, a state-run entity commandeered pri-
vately owned land chosen by the Corps as necessary for a hurricane protection project
and granted the federal government a “right of entry” to the commandeered property.219
The federal government subsequently entered and removed clay from the property for
use in repairing a damaged hurricane levee.220 The court’s causation analysis involved
an examination of the precise relationship between the federal government-defendant’s
authorization of the hurricane protection project and the state-run third party that had
commandeered the private property.221
210 See Abdullah, 84 F.3d at 21–22; Harms, 702 N.W.2d at 99.
211 631 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
212 Id. at 1270.
213 Id. at 1271.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1273.
217 See Nat’l Food & Beverage Co. v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 258, 264–66 (2010).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 261.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 264–66.
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2. Is the Plaintiff–Property Owner the Cause of the Taking?
Occasionally, a government-defendant to a takings action will claim that the harm
experienced by the plaintiff–property owner was caused not by the government, but
was instead due to the property owner’s decisions or actions.222 If the government’s
defense is successful, causation is missing and a reviewing court need not address the
merits of the takings claim.223 For example, “[a] property owner is responsible for
a law’s adverse effect on the property when the owner makes decisions which then
[trigger the law].”224 If an owner voluntarily rents land to tenants, and if a rent con-
trol law subsequently changes the nature of the leasing arrangement such that the
tenants remain, the owner cannot claim the law has caused a per se taking by phys-
ical invasion.225 The owner’s act of permitting the tenants access in the first place re-
sulted in their occupation of the property.226 It is only when the law in question effects
“required acquiescence” that it may be identified as the cause of the occupation.227
There are three ways in which a court reviewing a claim for just compensation may
find that property owners are responsible for the taking of their property as a result of
their own voluntary behavior. First, an owner’s actions may have put the property in
jeopardy of being taken.228 This finding may occur if the taking is a consequence of
the owner’s failure to take certain actions that would have preserved the interest.229
The owner, not the government, is the cause of a taking if the owner destroys or volun-
tarily relinquishes control over, or consents to an occupation of, the property alleged
to have been taken.230 The owner is the cause when the owner either abandons the
property or acquires property that is, by its geographical configuration, at risk of being
adversely affected by later government action.231
222 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.13.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1992).
226 Id.
227 FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987); Gulf Power Co. v. United States,
998 F. Supp. 1386, 1392–93, 1395 (N.D. Fla. 1998); see also Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179, 181 (1872).
228 See, e.g., FDIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 699 (5th Cir. 1991); Oblin Homes, Inc. v.
Vill. of Dobbs Ferry, 935 F. Supp. 497, 499–500 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Worsley Cos., Ins. v. Town
of Mount Pleasant, 528 S.E.2d 657, 660 (S.C. 2000); Dean v. Lehman, 18 P.3d 523, 530, 533
(Wash. 2001).
229 Griffin, 935 F.2d at 699; Oblin Homes, 935 F. Supp. at 499–500; Worsley, 528 S.E.2d
at 660; Dean, 18 P.3d at 533 (holding that deductions from funds received by prison inmates
to assist in costs of incarceration do not constitute takings).
230 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Hewett Prof’l, 895 P.2d 755, 763 (Or. 1995) (“Here, it was
[the property owner], not ODOT [Oregon Department of Transportation], that demolished
the Sylvan Building.”).
231 See, e.g., Anthony v. Franklin Cnty., 799 F.2d 681, 685–86 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The
plight in which [the property owners] claim to find themselves has not been produced by the
county [which terminated public ferry service to the owner’s island] but by nature itself.”).
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Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Donabar232 is an example of how an interest in private
property can be abandoned by a property owner.233 In this case, the property owner
failed to demonstrate his intention to retain his mineral interest in property, by either
filing notice or some other title transaction, after the mineral deeds were filed in a gas
company’s chain of title.234 The legal cause of the lapse of mineral rights was found
to be the property owner’s failure to preserve his interests, not the action of the state
in having the mineral rights lapse.235
Second, the owner may be said to have caused the taking when the property pur-
chased by the owner is subject to limitations already imposed by background prin-
ciples of the state’s law of property and nuisance.236 When a limitation “inheres in the
title itself,” the owner cannot claim that state action consistent with the limitation has
brought about a taking.237
Third, a property owner has caused the taking when the owner assumes the risk of
subsequent regulatory control.238 This occurs if it was unreasonable for the owner to
expect that the property would not be subject to some future liability or restriction.239
In this situation, the owner cannot claim that a law has effected a taking by its interfer-
ence with reasonable investment-backed expectations.240 The owner’s expectations
should have included some subsequent regulatory condition affecting the property.241
3. Has the Taking Been Caused by Acts of Nature or Normal Market Forces?
One frequently occurring factual situation giving rise to an inverse condemnation
claim is when a private owner’s property is flooded and the flooding is arguably the
232 127 P.3d 625 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
233 Id. at 636.
234 Id. at 638; see also United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 89 (1985) (holding that the fail-
ure to comply with a recording requirement constitutes an abandonment of a mining claim).
235 Rocket Oil & Gas, 127 P.3d at 637 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530
(1982)).
236 See, e.g., Hendler v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 611, 615 (1997) (observing that persons
who have created or maintained a nuisance are subject to the “nuisance exception” to the
Takings Clause).
237 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). When common law prop-
erty doctrine imposes limitations that are inherent in the title and government regulatory action
deprives an owner of the use of his property, a court will have to determine on a case-by-case
basis which limitation—the owner’s title or the regulation—is the cause of the taking. See,
e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 49 (1994) (holding that despite deed restrictions
in the title, the regulatory actions of the federal government caused the taking).
238 See, e.g., Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Golden Pac.
Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Burditt v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1376 (5th Cir. 1991).
239 Branch, F.3d at 1582; Golden Pacific Bancorp, 15 F.3d at 1074; Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1376.
240 See Connolly v. Pension Benefits Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226–27 (1986).
241 Id. at 227.
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result of some government action, such as the operation of a dam,242 flood control im-
provement,243 or drainage system.244 In such cases, if factors other than the government-
defendant are responsible for the harm suffered by the plaintiff, including acts of nature
such as storm events, or the decision of the plaintiff to build on a flood plain, the de-
fendant will not be found to be the cause of the taking.245 This rule applies generally
to factual situations in which the government’s actions produce harm in concert with
acts of nature.246 For example, an owner’s home can be destroyed by a fire that was
initially ignited by a government entity, but became out of control due to unexpected
winds.247 In these cases, the plaintiff must marshal facts that demonstrate that the gov-
ernment is the party responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, despite being, at most, an
indirect cause.248 Such plaintiffs risk a court characterizing an action not as a taking,
but as, at most, a tort.249
If the nature of the harm experienced by the property owner is some diminution
in the economic value of the property, an important causation issue is whether a
government actor is responsible for this loss or whether negative price and property
value changes are simply the result of normal market forces.250 When the effects of
a law depend upon a buyer’s possible action in a market, it may be that marketplace
realities—not the action of the state—are responsible for depressed property values.251
The market-as-cause explanation for financial loss or failure is especially likely when
the owner takes a knowledgeable risk in purchasing property, only to see its value
plummet when market and legal forces conspire to depress economic conditions.252
242 See, e.g., Leeth v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467, 485 (1991).
243 See, e.g., Belair v. Riverside Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 764 P.2d 1070, 1071 (Cal. 1998).
244 Hoover v. Pierce Cnty., 903 P.2d 464, 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
245 Belair, 764 U.S. at 1075, 1080.
246 See, e.g., Teegarden v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 252, 257 (1998) (holding that the Forest
Service’s decision to focus fire extinguishing efforts in high priority areas did not amount
to a taking of plaintiff’s land).
247 See, e.g., Thune v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 49, 53–54 (1998) (holding that although
the plaintiff’s claim would sound in tort, he could not recover on a taking theory because the
damage was caused by “intervening government impropriety or unanticipated natural events”).
248 See Teegarden, 42 Fed. Cl. at 257; Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406, 417–18
(1996) (finding that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to whether there
was a taking of beachfront property through erosion due to a federal harbor project).
249 Teegarden, 42 Fed. Cl. at 257; Thune, 41 Fed. Cl. at 53–54.
250 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 147–48
(1977).
251 Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of N.Y., 928 F. Supp. 407, 417 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Callaway Cmty. Hosp. v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 693, 698–99 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
252 See, e.g., Jackson Court Condos. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir.
1989) (“ [The owner] took a knowledgeable risk in purchasing the property and failed. It was
the market, rather than the City, which deprived [the owner] of that potential use.”); Adams v.
United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 132, 138 (1990) (“Under this alleged set of facts, the market, not the
[government], took plaintiffs’ investments.”).
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4. Has the Taking Been Caused by Some Third Party Who Is Not the
Government-Defendant?
To avoid judicial review of the merits of a plaintiff’s takings claim, a government-
defendant may claim that its actions are not the cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm.253
To support this argument, the defendant can point to some other person or entity as
being the true cause of the taking.254 Defendants assert this “it is not my fault” defense
most frequently when they are able to identify another government or private actor
that is more responsible for the plaintiff’s harm.255
a. Another Government Actor
A government entity that has been sued under the Takings Clause can sometimes
identify the action of another government entity as the true source of the taking.256 For
example, if the United States government causes harm to a property owner by physi-
cally appropriating the property pursuant to express or implicit authority, it may be
a proper defendant to a takings claim.257 However, if the defendant can show that the
appropriation was not authorized, but rather was an ultra vires act of a government
official, it may be able to avoid liability for the alleged harm.258 Similarly, when the
allegedly harmed property is located in or under the control of a foreign nation, the
United States may claim that the other nation is the cause of the taking.259 It is also
conceivable for state and federal law to work together to effectuate a taking.260 When
an owner is deprived of property by a combination of state and federal law, it must de-
cide whether the state or federal regulatory entity (or both) is the cause of the harm.261
b. Another Private Party
Sometimes a government-defendant will argue that the Takings Clause does not
apply because the plaintiff’s harm was caused not by the government, but instead by
a private party.262 To trigger the Takings Clause, the defendant must (1) be responsible
253 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.17 to .18.
254 Id.
255 Id.






262 Id. at 10-48.19 to .20.
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for the harm, and (2) be a government entity.263 Consider, for example, damages caused
to a store by a fleeing criminal who is being pursued by city police.264 The store owner
will not be able to sue the city to recover for damages to the store because the police
did not create the harmful situation and did not cause the criminal to enter the store.265
Moreover, if the criminal is deemed to be a private party rather than a government
actor, the state action doctrine will prevent the store owner from invoking the protec-
tions of the Fifth Amendment.266 In considering whether the state action doctrine is
satisfied, courts look for sufficient government control of, or nexus to, the defendant.267
III. GOVERNMENT ACTION AND THE TORT/TAKINGS DISTINCTION
The general rule for deciding causation issues that arise when choosing the proper
defendant in a takings claim requires a “[plaintiff–]property owner [to] demonstrate
that [its] property has been taken because of the action of the defendant-government
entity.”268 This rule, which is derived from the language of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, requires causation between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant;269
it allows for compensation only when a property owner can show that her property was
taken as a result of some action by a government-defendant.270
The Takings Clause’s “because of” requirement does not describe what type of
causation is required.271 Consequently, litigants in takings actions frequently argue for
and against competing formulations of causation.272 The resulting undefined standard
for causation has produced excessive litigation, and has left judges unable to standard-
ize a coherent test for determining the proper defendant when a taking is alleged.273
To determine whether a particular act has caused an outcome, one must first de-
fine the term “cause” with some degree of precision.274 The word “causation” tends






268 Id. at 10-48.6; see also United States v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 2d 203, 228 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
269 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.5.
270 Id.
271 See id., at 10-48.5 to .6 (discussing the court’s application of the causation requirement).
272 See In re Smith v. Town of Mendon, 4 N.Y.3d 1, 24 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting various tests
for takings cases).
273 Kenneth Salzberg, “Takings” as Due Process, or Due Process as “Takings”?, 36 VAL.
U. L. REV. 413, 413 n.* (2002).
274 It is important to note that “intent” is a concept which is distinct from the concept of
“causation,” although the two ideas are often intertwined when causation is analyzed in tak-
ings actions. The distinction between “intent” and “causation” is significant for purposes of the
following discussion outlining the history of causation analysis under the Fifth Amendment.
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cause.275 A defendant’s act is a cause-in-fact of a plaintiff’s injury when, as a factual
matter, the defendant’s act contributed to producing the injury.276 Proximate cause
is a policy-based legal limit on cause-in-fact that turns on whether the plaintiff’s
harm was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s act.277 For purposes of this Article,
we will assume that causation means “cause-in-fact,” and we will use the term “legal
causation” to refer to judicially imposed limits on harm for which a defendant may
be held responsible.
Cause-in-fact and proximate cause concepts are used to determine liability in both
tort claims and takings claims.278 However, standards of legal causation may be more
difficult to meet for the purposes of establishing a taking than for prevailing on claims
based in tort.279 For example, a defendant may be held liable in tort for the foresee-
able incidental and consequential damages resulting from its negligent actions.280 By
contrast, just compensation under the Fifth Amendment will not be provided for inci-
dental and consequential harm resulting from an act of the government-defendant in
a takings action.281 When a plaintiff alleges that government action has caused a taking
under the Fifth Amendment, its ultimate goal is to obtain just compensation for the
alleged harm.282 However, before a court will entertain the plaintiff’s action, it must
decide whether the claim is a tort or a taking.283 This section will examine the differ-
ence between torts and takings, and explore the various ways that federal and state
courts have distinguished them.
A. The Tort/Takings Distinction
One heavily litigated causal concept that arises in takings claims is the “tort/takings
distinction.”284 When faced with a takings challenge, a government-defendant—
especially a federal government-defendant—may concede that the action at issue did
275 See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII, 94 GEO. L.J. 489,
495–96 (2006) (citing 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 60 (Paul Edwards ed., 1973))
(discussing two distinct concepts of causation in the law—“cause in fact” and “proximate
cause”); see also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 112 (2d ed. 1985).
276 See Katz, supra note 275, at 495 n.18.
277 See id.
278 See Troup v. Fischer Steel Corp., 236 S.W.3d 143, 146–49 (Tenn. 2007); Ventures Nw.
Ltd. P’ship v. State, 914 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
279 See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text.
280 Holladay v. Speed, 208 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tenn Ct. App. 2005).
281 See Ridge Line v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
282 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that there must be “just compensation” for a gov-
ernment taking of private property for public use).
283 See City of Dall. v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 316 (2004) (discussing the difference
between a tort and a constitutional taking).
284 See Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 79 (2005) (“One issue that has over the
decades divided this court is the distinction between torts and takings under the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.”).
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stem from the government, but then argue that the action was actually a tort for which
the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction.285 The primary purpose of the tort/takings
distinction test is to resolve this jurisdictional issue: if the action resulted in a taking,
then the reviewing court has jurisdiction to address the merits of the claim.286 If the
result of the action was instead a tort, the takings claim must be dismissed.287
On the federal level, the importance of distinguishing between a tort and a taking
derives primarily from a long-established reading of the Tucker Act.288 The Tucker
Act pertains to the United States Court of Federal Claims (Court of Claims)289 and
proscribes jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort.290 Pursuant to this act, federal
courts have developed a general standard for determining whether a plaintiff’s claim
is properly brought as a taking.291 State courts have also distinguished between torts
and takings for jurisdictional purposes.292
Prior to the enactment of the Tucker Act in 1887, the Court of Claims had juris-
diction only over “claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the gov-
ernment of the United States.”293 Although jurisdiction did not yet extend to cases aris-
ing under the Constitution, the Court of Claims recognized takings claims based on
285 See id.
286 Id.
287 See Struthers v. City of Seattle, No. 63943-9-I, No. 65201-0-I, 2011 Wash. App.
LEXIS 878, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2011) (“[N]ot every government action that takes,
damages, or destroys property is a taking.” (citations omitted)).
288 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006); see also infra notes 299–301 and accompanying text.
289 The Court of Claims originated in 1855 when it was created by Congress to provide for
the determination of private claims against the United States. United States Court of Federal
Claims: The Peoples Court, U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts
.gov/sites/default/files/court_info/Court_History_Brochure.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012).
Today, the Court has nationwide jurisdiction over most suits for monetary damages against the
federal government and sits, without a jury, to determine issues of law and fact and render final
judgments. Id. This jurisdiction includes claims against the United States for just compen-
sation brought under the Fifth Amendment. Id. Many state courts find the decisions of the Court
of Claims to be persuasive authority. See, e.g., Harms v. City of Sibley, 702 N.W.2d 91, 97
(Iowa 2005) (“Because the federal and state constitutional provisions regarding takings are
nearly identical, federal cases interpreting the federal provision are persuasive in our interpre-
tation of the state provision.”). For a more detailed explanation of the history and jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims, see U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov (last
visited May 1, 2012).
290 Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 95 (2005).
291 Id. at 95 (“The general takings analysis in the Federal Circuit has been organized into
a two-part prima facie test, requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) a relevant property interest
and (2) a government action that has resulted in a taking.” (citing Adams v. United States, 391
F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
292 See, e.g., Struthers, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 878, at *10 (applying a “necessary incident”
test to determine whether a plaintiff’s claim was properly brought as a taking).
293 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
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a theory of a breach of implied contract between the federal government and private
parties.294 This practice was sanctioned by the Supreme Court.295 Under the implied
contract theory, a plaintiff may prevail in a takings challenge if it proves that govern-
ment action resulted in a breach of the implied contract not to “take” private property
without providing just compensation.296 For such a claim to be successful, a plaintiff
owner must show that the government-defendant subjectively intended to cause the
harm to the plaintiff’s private property.297 Federal courts still use a subjective intent
inquiry as part of the tort/takings distinction test.298
When the government enacted the Tucker Act, it waived sovereign immunity
with respect to takings actions brought by private parties directly under the Fifth
Amendment.299 The Tucker Act states in pertinent part:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdic-
tion to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or un-
liquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.300
Since the passage of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff that suffers a taking by the fed-
eral government is no longer required to establish a contractual claim for liability to
294 See, e.g., Shreve v. United States, 8 U.S. Cong. Rep. C.C. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1860); Wirt v.
United States, 6 U.S. Cong. Rep. C.C. 172 (Ct. Cl. 1858); Wilkes v. United States, 6 U.S.
Cong. Rep. C.C. 167 (Ct. Cl. 1858). As noted by the Court of Federal Claims in Hansen v.
United States, “[t]his was an adaptation of the common law principle that plaintiffs could
waive the tort that deprived them of property and sue in assumpsit.” 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 107 (2005)
(citing Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. 285 (1827)).
295 United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 657 (1884) (“Such an implication
being consistent with the constitutional duty of the government, as well as with common justice,
the claimant’s cause of action is one that arises out of implied contract, within the meaning
of the statute which confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims of actions founded ‘upon any
contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States.’” (citations omitted)).
296 Id. at 657.
297 See Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 96.
298 See Ridge Line v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
299 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2006).
300 Id. State courts also recognize that sovereign immunity from takings actions is waived
when state constitutions provide for just compensation remedies. For example, the Texas
Constitution provides for adequate compensation as a remedy for takings caused by the
government. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). Texas courts have held that, pursuant to this express
constitutional waiver, governmental immunity does not shield government actors from an
action for compensation under the takings clause. City of Dall. v. CKS Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
345 S.W.3d 199, 201 (Tex. App. 2011).
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obtain just compensation.301 Thus, the enactment of the Tucker Act prompted federal
courts to formulate a causation-based standard to determine if a claim could be heard
as a taking.
State courts have followed suit and developed their own tests for deciding whether
a plaintiff’s takings claim needs to be refiled as a tort.302 Although state jurisdiction
is not constricted by the Tucker Act,303 it is still important to distinguish a plaintiff’s
claim as either a tort or a taking, because the two claims usually require different ele-
ments of proof.304 For example, in City of Tyler v. Likes,305 the Texas Supreme Court
held that “[a] person’s property may be ‘taken, damaged, or destroyed’ and therefore
require compensation if an injury results from either the construction of public works
or their subsequent maintenance and operation. However, mere negligence which
eventually contributes to the destruction of property is not a taking.”306 Tyler was
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the sole issue of whether the
government-defendant was negligent when it took action that harmed the plaintiff.307
There, negligence could result in only a tort at best.308 And torts against state govern-
ments often must confront either the barrier of governmental immunity or the con-
ditions of Governmental Tort Claims Acts.309
Policy reasons may also influence the decision to distinguish between torts and
takings.310 A policy against governments acting as de facto insurers against destructive
acts of nature seemed to influence the court in Struthers v. City of Seattle.311 There,
the government-defendant constructed a storm water outfall facility to channel water
through pipes that bypassed the plaintiff’s property.312 For decades, the facility worked
according to its design and without incident.313 It was only when the pipes fell into dis-
repair that damage to plaintiff’s property began to occur.314 The Washington Court of
Appeals noted that “the City is not an insurer against all flood damage,” and that in
this case, “damage allegedly caused by the government negligently failing to properly
maintain an outfall facility constructed years ago gives rise to a tort claim, not an
301 See Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 96.
302 See infra notes 369–88 and accompanying text.
303 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2006).
304 See infra notes 369–73 and accompanying text.
305 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997).
306 Id. at 504–05 (citations omitted).
307 Id. at 505.
308 Id. at 504–05.
309 See, e.g., Barton v. City of Midwest City, 257 P.3d 422, 427 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).
310 See infra notes 311–16 and accompanying text.
311 No. 63943-9-I, No. 65201-0-I, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 878 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 18,
2011).
312 Id. at *2.
313 Id. at *13–14.
314 Id.
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inverse condemnation claim.”315 Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the inverse
condemnation claim on summary judgment was affirmed.316
B. The Federal Tort/Takings Tests
The Federal Circuit has adopted a tort-taking inquiry that determines whether
“treatment under takings law, as opposed to tort law, is appropriate under the circum-
stances.”317 It is generally accepted that the major difference between a tort and a taking
is that an injury which is only “in its nature indirect and consequential” is no more than
a tort, and cannot be a taking.318 Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States319 is a frequently cited
case that sets forth the modern two-part analysis for distinguishing between torts and
takings within the Federal Circuit:
First, a property loss compensable as a taking only results when
the government intends to invade a protected property interest or
the asserted invasion is the direct, natural, or probable result of an
authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury
inflicted by the action. . . . Second, the nature and magnitude of
the government action must be considered.320
The Ridge Line decision incorporates both “intent” and “causation” requirements
by stating the first prong of the test in the disjunctive: either intent or causation is suf-
ficient for the government action to be considered a taking.321 If the plaintiff to a takings
action does not show that the government-defendant “intentionally appropriated” the
plaintiff’s property, then the reviewing court must determine whether the harm was the
“direct, natural, or probable result” of the government’s action—a taking—or “merely
an incidental or consequential injury, perhaps compensable as a tort.”322 According to
Ridge Line, the “direct, natural, or probable result” standard will be satisfied—and
the action will be a taking—if the plaintiff–property owner’s harm was the “predict-
able result” of the government action.323 The causation analysis can be confusing be-
cause it combines tort law’s traditional cause-in-fact requirement with a more limited
315 Id. at *14. (citing Peterson v. King Cnty., 252 P.2d 797, 800 (Wash. 1953)).
316 Id. at *20.
317 Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
318 See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. 166, 172 (1871).
319 346 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
320 Id. at 1355 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Within the Federal Circuit,
the Ridge Line test “must be utilized in distinguishing a taking from a tort in inverse con-
demnation cases.” Moden v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 275, 282 (2004).
321 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355.
322 Id. at 1356.
323 Id.
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standard for proximate cause that forecloses compensation for incidental or conse-
quential injuries.324
The second prong of the Ridge Line test is less concerned with intent and causation,
but it is just as important when distinguishing between a tort or a taking. It requires that
a court look to the merits of the claim to “consider whether the government’s interfer-
ence with any property rights of [the plaintiff] was substantial and frequent enough
to rise to the level of a taking.”325 For example, in a case concerning aerial invasions
of private property, the Court of Federal Claims noted that “[n]either this court, the
Federal Circuit, nor the Court of Claims has held that a two-month increase in the
number or intensity of flight operations at a military installation is sufficient to effect
a taking of an avigation easement over nearby land.”326 As a result of this finding, the
alleged harm caused by the invasions failed to satisfy the second prong of the Ridge
Line test and did not rise to the level of a compensable taking.327
The tort/takings distinction test from Ridge Line reflects the close historical rela-
tionship between tort and takings, as it involves causal concepts that are inherent in
both.328 The Ridge Line test holds that intent is not necessarily an essential element of
a taking.329 It incorporates aspects of the negligence analysis from torts and uses a tort-
like proximate cause test whereby the government is deemed the cause of the harm if
the government’s action is (a) the cause-in-fact of the harm and (b) the proximate cause
of the harm, with “proximate cause” defined as a natural, continuous, and uninter-
rupted flow of events between the government-defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s
harm with no superseding cause to remove liability from the government-defendant.330
When applying this test, judicial opinions sometimes refer to the consequential dam-
ages rule, which is essentially the same as a proximate cause test: causation is missing
under the consequential damages rule when the actions of the defendant are too remote
from the harm for liability to attach to the defendant.331
The first prong of the Ridge Line test is usually applied by first checking for intent,
and if no intent is found, ascertaining causation.332 When Ridge Line framed its analysis
of causation, it relied on precedent to explain what might be a “direct, natural, or prob-
able result” of an action by government.333 To illustrate what this causation standard
entails, Ridge Line cited several previously used causative formulations.334 A probable
324 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102–04 (N.Y. 1928).
325 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1357.
326 Goodman v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 289, 316 (2011).
327 Id. at 316–17.
328 Hansen v. U.S., 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 96–97 (2005).
329 Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355–56.
330 Id.
331 See, e.g., Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 108.
332 Id. at 113–14.
333 346 F.3d at 1356.
334 Id.
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result may be: (1) a “direct or necessary result,”335 (2) a result that could have been
“foreseen or foretold,”336 or (3) a result that was within the natural order of events.337
Ridge Line cited a well-known analysis from Cotton Land v. United States338:
If engineers had studied the question in advance they would, we
suppose, have predicted what occurred. If they had studied the
question in advance and had said, in a report, “If you build Parker
Dam to a crest of 450.4 feet, the pool will cover the land described
below. The effect of the flow of the river into the pool will be to
form a delta which, within approximately three years will raise the
bed and the surface of the river, will cause it to overflow its banks
and will thus inundate the lands described below,” would the fact
of that formal forewarning be a decisive fact in such a suit as this?
Should the fact that the engineering study was not so complete as
to include a prediction as to lands beyond the bed of the reservoir
prevent a court from looking at the actual and natural consequence
of the Government’s act?339
In Cotton Land, the Court of Claims looked to the law of torts when faced with a
“remoteness of cause” defense raised by the government-defendant in a taking claim.340
The government-defendant erected a dam that set in motion a chain of events eventually
resulting in the flooding of the plaintiff–property owner’s land.341 The court found
that although the harm was not the direct result of the government’s action, there
was no intervening event breaking the chain of causation, and therefore the harm to
the land was foreseeable and the flooding was the actual and natural consequence of
the government’s act.342 The Cotton Land analysis used a tort-like proximate-cause
335 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 150 (1924).
336 John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 146 (1921) (noting that the movement
of percolating waters is hidden and thus the harm produced from such waters is unforeseeable).
337 See Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232, 233 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
338 Id.
339 Id. at 233–34.
340 Id. at 233 (“In the law of torts, the remoteness is usually produced by some unforeseeable
or so-called intervening cause, which is said to break the chain of legal connection between the
defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s loss. By that test, the company’s loss in this case was not
legally remote.”).
341 Id. at 232–33. Specifically, the government built a dam that impounded the waters of
a river and formed a lake. Id. Thereafter, the river began to deposit its sand at the point where
it collided with still waters of the lake. Id. The sand deposit obstructed the “full and rapid
flow of the river[, thus] filling up [ ] the bed of the river [and] rais[ing] the level of its water
[so that the river] overflowed its banks” and flooded the plaintiff’s nearby land. Id.
342 Id. at 233–35.
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test and explicitly rejected any notion of subjective foreseeability in favor of (at least
implicitly) an objective test.343
In support of its test, Ridge Line also cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in
John Horstmann Co. v. United States, which was issued at a time when the Supreme
Court still used an implied contract approach to determine whether the Court of Claims
had jurisdiction over a takings action.344 In Horstmann, the Court denied compensation
to a plaintiff even though a government-defendant’s action was a cause-in-fact of the
alleged harm.345 The claim failed because the requirement of subjective, specific intent
was not met—the harm, which was caused by the movement of hidden percolating
underground waters, was unforeseeable.346
The requirement of subjective intent in Horstmann seems to contradict the
analysis in Cotton Land, which used a more objective test to search for causation.347
This apparent contradiction may be one reason that the Ridge Line standard some-
times spurs controversy and has the potential to produce conflicting results.348 For
example, in Moden v. United States, the litigants proposed different outcomes under
the causation prong of the Ridge Line tort/takings distinction test because they con-
strued the Ridge Line standard in different ways.349 The Moden court attempted to
clarify the Ridge Line standard by focusing on the role of foreseeability.350 However,
this approach was sharply criticized in another decision of that court, Hansen v. United
States.351 The Hansen decision claimed that the Moden court “misconstrue[d] and
overemphasize[d] the role of foreseeability when applying the traditional tort-standard
of causation to a takings claim.”352
In Moden, the plaintiff and the federal government offered contrasting versions of
the Ridge Line “direct, natural, or probable result” standard.353 The government con-
tended that the injury resulting from the act must be foreseeable, whereas the Modens
contended that the government act need only be the “cause-in-fact” of the resulting
injury.354 Under a pure cause-in-fact test, it does not matter if a result is intended, sub-
jectively foreseen, or objectively foreseeable. What does matter is whether the harm
would not have occurred but for the government’s action. The Court of Claims’
decision in Moden focused on the foreseeability feature of the Ridge Line analysis,
however, requiring the Modens to show evidence that the harm was the foreseeable
343 Id. at 234–35.
344 257 U.S. 138, 141 (1921).
345 Id. at 146.
346 Id.
347 See Cotton Land Co., 75 F. Supp. at 233–34.
348 See Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 112–15 (2005).
349 60 Fed. Cl. 275, 282–83, 288–89 (2004).
350 Id. at 283–86, 289.
351 65 Fed. Cl. At 97.
352 Id. (citation omitted).
353 Moden, 60 Fed. Cl. at 278–79.
354 Id.
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or predictable result of the government defendant’s action.355 The case was dismissed
because the Modens failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the fore-
seeability of the harm.356
In Hansen, the Court of Claims criticized the emphasis that the Moden decision
placed on foreseeability when determining causation.357 The defendant in Hansen
relied on the Court of Claims’ decision in Moden for the proposition that subjective
foreseeability was relevant when analyzing causation in a takings action:
Generally, the government argues that [it should not be liable
because] its agents at the Forest Service . . . never contemplated
that burying EDB [a toxic chemical] at the Work Center might
cause groundwater contamination that would spread to the local
water supply. Moreover, even if it was possible to foresee the like-
lihood of contamination, the government claims that the Forest
Service had no knowledge at the time the EDB was buried that
EDB was a dangerous contaminant that, once introduced to the
local water supply, would cause the underground water to be un-
safe for virtually any ordinary use.358
According to Hansen, the focus should not be placed on a requirement of fore-
seeability per se, but rather on the traditional tort-causation prong of the Ridge Line
test under which “the role of subjective elements such as the government’s intent or
whether it actually foresaw the harm are obviated.”359 The Hansen court further noted
that the Moden decision incorrectly applied foreseeability “not to a determination of
the predictability of whether the government’s actions caused the harm in question,
but, rather, to whether the government’s agents did or should have known that their
actions would result in harm.”360 According to the Hansen court, the Moden analysis
made the categorical mistake of equating foreseeability with specific intent and not
causation.361
Although Hansen had criticized Moden’s approach to the tort/takings distinction,
Moden was nonetheless affirmed on appeal.362 The appellate decision by the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals did, however, briefly note that the Court of Federal Claims’
inquiry into the actual knowledge of the government defendant in Moden was “too
355 Id. at 289.
356 Id. at 289–90.
357 Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 97.
358 Id. at 97–98.
359 Id. at 98.
360 Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
361 Id.
362 Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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strict a requirement since it is subjective and requires specific knowledge.”363 The Court
of Appeals summarized the situation as follows: “[T]he government’s interpretation
requires that the injury was the likely result of the act, whereas the Modens’ interpreta-
tion requires only that the act was the likely cause of the injury.”364 The government
found support for its contention in Ridge Line, in which the standard set forth referred
to a “‘direct, natural, or probable result,’ not a direct, natural, or probable cause.”365
Thus, the uneasy status of the tort/takings distinction in the Federal Circuit seems
to hinge on a requirement of causation plus something more—an injury that is fore-
seeable.366 If the plaintiff’s injury is found to be the objectively foreseeable or predict-
able “result” of a government act, the act may be deemed a taking.367 But when the
government’s act merely “caused the injury,” without more, the claim is instead a tort
at most.368
C. State Tort/Takings Distinction Test(s)
On the state level, courts may have jurisdiction to decide takings claims as well
as claims that sound in tort, but they must still distinguish between torts and takings
when determining whether a reviewing court can address the merits of a claim for just
compensation.369 In general, the tort/takings tests used by state courts resemble the
federal formulations in which a taking requires the government to satisfy requirements
of causation and/or intent.370 However, state courts do not always apply tests that are
equivalent to the federal formulations. Some state courts hold that intent is a neces-
sary prerequisite to finding a taking as opposed to a tort.371 Some courts allow an infer-
ence of intent to be drawn from the government-defendant’s action if the natural and
ordinary consequence of that action is a substantial interference of property rights.372
Other state courts allow a takings claim to proceed even though the government act
that allegedly resulted in the harm was only a substantial concurrent cause.373
363 Id. at 1344 n.3.
364 Id. at 1343 (emphasis added).
365 Id. (emphasis added).
366 The Moden court stated that “[i]n addition to causation, an inverse condemnation plaintiff
must prove that the government should have predicted or foreseen the resulting injury.” Id.
367 Id.
368 Id. at 1345.
369 See, e.g., Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 250 P.3d 7, 8 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
370 See Doner v. Zody, 958 N.E.2d 1235, 1248 (Ohio 2011) (applying the “two part
inquiry” from Ridge Line to distinguish between a tort and a taking); see also infra note 374
and accompanying text.
371 MBP Corp. v. Bd. of Trs. Galveston Wharves, 297 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Tex. Ct. App.
2009) (stating that a requisite intent is needed for a takings case).
372 See infra note 376 and accompanying text.
373 See infra note 387 and accompanying text.
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The government-defendant in Dunn v. City of Milwaukie argued that the plaintiff’s
cause of action did not satisfy the elements of a taking because it failed to set forth evi-
dence that the government either intended to cause a taking, or substantially interfered
with the plaintiff’s private property.374 The government-defendant relied on a prior
holding by the Oregon Supreme Court that “a claim for inverse condemnation requires
a showing that the governmental acts alleged to constitute a taking of private property
were done with the intent to take the property.”375 However, the Oregon Supreme Court
opinion noted that “[a] factfinder may infer the intent to take from the governmental
defendant’s action if . . . the natural and ordinary consequence of that action was the
substantial interference with property rights.”376 The causation issue in Dunn boiled
down to whether the harm resulting from the city’s routine hydrocleaning was suf-
ficiently “unnatural” or “extraordinary” to defeat a takings claim, or if the harm was
a “natural and ordinary consequence” of the government action and thus the claim
could proceed.377
In Struthers v. City of Seattle,378 the Court of Appeals of Washington applied a
“necessary incident” test to determine whether public interference with private lands
amounted to a taking.379 The opinion quoted the Washington Supreme Court in hold-
ing that “not every government action that takes, damages, or destroys property is a
taking.”380 To establish a takings claim, the plaintiff was required to prove that the
interference was “reasonably necessary” to the maintenance or operation of property
devoted to a public use.381 The court held that “where a municipality devotes property
to public use and damage to the private property results from the negligent mainte-
nance of the public property, an inverse condemnation claim may not exist.”382
In California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau v. City of Palo
Alto,383 the California Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of how to apply a
troubling conceptual premise for causation that had been set forth by the California
Supreme Court: “A property owner may recover just compensation from a public en-
tity for ‘any actual physical injury to real property proximately caused by [a public]
improvement as deliberately designed and constructed . . . whether foreseeable or
374 250 P.3d at 8.
375 Id. at 10 (quoting Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 56 P.3d 396, 401 (Or. 2002)).
376 Id. (alteration in original).
377 Id. at 10–11.
378 Struthers v. City of Seattle, No. 63943-9-I, No. 65201-0-I, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS
878, at *14 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2011) (“[I]n this case, damage allegedly caused by the
government negligently failing to properly maintain an outfall facility constructed years ago
gives rise to a tort claim, not an inverse condemnation claim.”).
379 Id. at *9–10.
380 Id. at *9.
381 Id. at *10.
382 Id. at *11.
383 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503 (Ct. App. 2006).
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not.’”384 A subsequent California Supreme Court decision identified the problem with
its earlier articulation of proximate causation: “Our [prior] decision . . . contained the
seeds of confusion through its combination of ‘proximate cause’ terminology with
the elimination of foreseeability as an element of inverse condemnation.”385
The Court of Appeals tried to reconcile this inconsistency by holding that to estab-
lish the element of proximate causation for a claim of inverse condemnation, a plaintiff
must prove “a ‘substantial cause-and-effect relationship which excludes the probability
that other forces alone produced the injury.’”386 The cause-and-effect relationship may
exist even when an independent force contributes to the injury as long as the injury
occurred in substantial part because of the governmental act.387 In California, it appears
that a takings claim may proceed against a government-defendant when (1) the govern-
ment act is the substantial cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and (2) if other forces alone
would not have caused this injury.388
IV. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF CAUSATION UNDER THE OTHER
FOUR FACTUAL SETTINGS
The cases discussed in Part IV involve situations in which a government-defendant
to a takings action argues that some other party, entity, or occurrence is the true cause
of the plaintiff’s alleged harm. The state action doctrine may also be implicated when
more than one party is involved in the setting that produces the harm to the plaintiff–
property owner and one of those parties is not a government actor.389 For either situ-
ation, the threshold question for a takings action becomes: Is a third party, entity, or
natural occurrence the cause of the harm, or does the government-defendant’s involve-
ment in the harmful action justify a finding that it should be held responsible for pro-
viding just compensation?
A. Actions by Private Parties, Taken Pursuant to State or Federal Law,
Damage Private Property
Sometimes, government authorization permits a private party to take action that
may ultimately result in harm to another private party’s property.390 When a plaintiff
attempts to sue a government-defendant for enacting a law or regulation that enables
a private party to cause harm to the plaintiff’s property, a reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the action of the private party, taken pursuant to the law or regulation,
384 Id. at 506 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
385 Belair v. Riverside Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 764 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Cal. 1988).
386 Id. at 1074 (citation omitted).
387 Id. at 1075.
388 Id.
389 See infra Part IV.D.
390 See infra Part IV.A.1.
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is the cause of the plaintiff’s harm, or if the law itself is the cause of the harm.391 If the
private party’s action is shown to be the true cause of the harm, the plaintiff’s only
remedy may be to bring a tort claim against the private party.392
If there is no “causal connection”393 between an authorizing statute and the conse-
quence alleged to be a taking, the statute is not the cause of the possible Fifth Amend-
ment violation.394 On the other hand, the government is the cause of the harm and a
proper defendant in a takings action if: (1) the action by a private party that has harmed
a private property owner was required by the government, (2) there is a sufficient nexus
between the government action and the action of the private party, or (3) the harm is
a foreseeable and inevitable consequence of the government action.395
1. Has Government Required the Private Action?
A government entity will be held responsible for a taking if it requires a prop-
erty owner to engage in a physical occupation of another private property.396 The
government’s requirement of the plaintiff’s submission is the key to this concept of
physical occupation.397 The government’s authorization of the “compelled physical
taking” triggers the Takings Clause and subjects the government to liability.398
Courts traditionally look to the character of the government action to determine
whether the action is a permanent physical occupation of property.399 For example, the
analysis of the character of the government law or regulation was the test used to find
a taking in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.400 There, a state regulation
required landlords to permit a cable company to install cable cords on rental property.401
That regulation satisfied the government action requirement for purposes of a takings
claim.402 Similarly, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,403 statutory authorization of a dam
that caused flooding of private lands was sufficient to trigger a Takings Clause vio-
lation because the regulation compelled the building of the dam, which resulted in
flooding—a physical occupation of private property.404
391 See infra Part IV.A.1.
392 See infra Part II.A.
393 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Comm’r of Ins., 84 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1996).
394 Id.
395 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.8.
396 Id. at 10-48.9.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
400 Id. at 441.
401 Id. at 421.
402 Id.
403 80 U.S. 166 (1872).
404 Id. at 177–80.
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In Abdullah v. Commissioner of Insurance,405 the plaintiff claimed that a statute
caused a taking because it resulted in higher insurance rates.406 The statute required
plaintiff’s insurance carrier to analyze certain risk factors when setting insurance rates
or premiums.407 However, the plaintiff was unable to show that the risk assessment
would necessarily result in confiscatory rates.408 Because the statute did not result
in the particular harm suffered by the plaintiff per se, there was no causal connection
between the statute and the rates claimed to be confiscatory.409
Although “the legislature may legalize what would otherwise be a public nui-
sance, it may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance” if such immu-
nity ultimately results in a taking of private property for public use.410 In Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co., Congress had authorized the defendant, a private railroad
operating company, to construct a tunnel in the middle of an inhabited portion of the
city.411 The tunnel had a portal that allowed gasses and smoke generated by the en-
gines of the trains to escape.412 The gas and smoke caused special and peculiar damage
to the plaintiff’s property, which was located in close proximity to the portal.413 The
Court found that the damage caused by the escaping gas and smoke was a necessary
consequence of the portal, and thus Congress could not authorize the imposition of the
burden on the plaintiff’s property without providing just compensation.414 The Court
distinguished between the damage attributable to the gases and smoke from the engines
in the tunnel, which was actionable as a taking, and the smoke emitted from the engines
on the tracks adjacent to private lands, for which there was no right of action.415
A taking will not be found when the government only regulates the consequences
that may occur after one private party voluntarily permits occupation by another pri-
vate party.416 When the required acquiescence is missing, and is instead replaced by
government regulation after-the-fact, the regulation alone cannot constitute sufficient
government action to trigger the Takings Clause.417 In cases in which the private prop-
erty owner invites the use being made of the property by another private party, the
Supreme Court has held that this kind of government involvement is insufficient to
activate the Takings Clause.418 When no one is being forced to submit to another’s
405 84 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1996).
406 Id. at 19.
407 Id. at 20.
408 Id. at 22.
409 Id.
410 Richard v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 553 (1914).
411 Id. at 557.
412 Id. at 549.
413 Id.
414 Id. at 557.
415 Id. at 557–58.
416 See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1992).
417 See, e.g., FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251–52 (1987).
418 See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. at 530–31.
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invasion, but rather the invasion is by invitation and the government is simply regu-
lating the effects of the invitation, the Constitution is not implicated.419
2. Is There a Sufficient Nexus Between the Government Action and a Third
Party’s Action?
The Fifth Amendment may mandate that a government-defendant to a takings
claim provide just compensation for injuries caused by the actions of a private party
when: (1) the government approves conduct of a private party that causes harm to the
plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff’s harm is a likely result of the government’s approval, and
(3) a close relationship or nexus exists between the government and the private party
whose actions produce the plaintiff’s harm.420 Courts seem most interested in whether
there is a close relationship or nexus to the private party, and this element may be
proven by the existence of certain facts.421 For example, liability may be attributed to
the government if the approved conduct of government contractors causes harm to a
plaintiff’s property.422 A sufficient nexus may be found when a public entity engages
a third party to create a public improvement.423 Government-defendants will also gen-
erally be held responsible for a taking when they not only approve third-party action,
but also authorize and allow the third party’s action for a public purpose.424
State-approved private action may be transmuted into government action when
the government does not require submission to a physical invasion, but instead en-
courages a private party to take action that harms another private party’s property.425
For example, in Perkins v. Board of Supervisors,426 a threshold issue was whether the
action of a private agricultural association taken pursuant to a zoning amendment by
the local zoning board constituted government action.427 By amending a zoning ordi-
nance, the zoning board permitted the association to conduct figure-eight automobile
racing for five days during a local fair.428 The racing allegedly harmed the plaintiff’s
private property.429 The reviewing court reasoned that although the conduct was at
the direction of the association, the “reality of the actions of the local zoning board”
should not be ignored.430 The action of the private association was in effect the action
419 See generally id. at 530–31; Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 251–52.






426 636 N.W.2d 58 (Iowa 2001).
427 Id. at 70.
428 Id. at 62–63.
429 Id. at 69.
430 Id. at 70.
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of the zoning board, which constituted government action.431 “The issue then [became]
whether the [board’s] activity [rose] to the level of a compensable taking.”432
3. Is the Harm to the Plaintiff–Property Owner a Foreseeable and Inevitable
Consequence of the Third Party Action that was Authorized by Government?
Action taken pursuant to government regulation may be sufficient to trigger the
Takings Clause when physical invasion of private property is a foreseeable and inevi-
table consequence of the actions of the local governments.433 However, if the physical
harm is due to a private party, the property owner will not be able to look to the Takings
Clause for protection.434 In general, courts use the “state action doctrine” to determine
if some alleged harm can be attributed to a government-defendant.435
[S]tate action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation
[such as an uncompensated taking] “caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is respon-
sible,” and [a finding] that “the party charged with the deprivation
[is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”436
Takings jurisprudence incorporates the state actor requirement and provides that
a party may recover just compensation from a government whose approval of private
action “necessarily results” in a taking of another’s private property.437
The necessary result test holds that government action will not be found when a
government actor authorizes the third party’s action, but the action that harms the other
private party is not a necessary consequence of the authorization.438 For example, in
Navajo Nation v. United States,439 the Navajo tribe contended that the Hopi tribe was
acting as an agent of the United States when the Hopi tribe imposed a moratorium on
431 Id.
432 Id.
433 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.8.
434 Id.
435 See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999).
436 Id. at 50 (alteration in original) (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982)).
437 See, e.g., Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 921–22 (Colo.
1993); Kite v. Westworth Vill., 853 S.W.2d 200, 201–02 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); see also Harris
Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Adam, 56 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
State had control of highway and inability to properly control design of highway could result
in a taking).
438 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.11.
439 631 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Navajo construction activities pursuant to a federally imposed requirement of mutual
consent between the tribes for development of the region.440 In Navajo Nation, the
government-defendant authorized the Hopi tribe’s action, but the authorization did not
necessarily lead to a physical invasion of the Navajo tribe’s property and there was no
acceptance by the government of the Hopi action.441 In other words, the harm was not
a foreseeable and inevitable consequence of the United States’ authorization of the
mutual consent requirement.442 The government may not be successfully sued for a
taking for the unintended, unforeseeable consequences of private action.443
By contrast, in National Food & Beverage Co. v. United States,444 the federal
government was the responsible party when the plaintiff’s land was commandeered
by a state-run third party pursuant to federal authorization.445 The court reviewed the
actions taken by the state, the state-run third party, and the federal government.446
These actions included a federal-private mutual cooperation agreement, a simulta-
neous commandeering of the plaintiff’s property after the Army Corps of Engineers
received authorization to enter it, and the physical removal of clay by the Corps.447
These actions illustrated that the federal government and the third party’s actions were
“two coordinate and coordinated parts of the same undertaking.”448 As such, the
“undertaking was overwhelmingly an effort of the federal government, in which the
[state] had a very limited role.”449
The general rule is that a government actor will be held to have intended the
foreseeable consequences of its actions.450 For example, local governments occasion-
ally permit private parties to build on the surface of land, although the mineral rights
to the land have been severed and belong to another private party.451 In such situations,
the government’s permission reverses the traditional dominance of the mineral estate.452
This consequence is not unforeseeable; harm to the owner of the mineral estates is a
natural and inevitable consequence of the government action.453 The government will
440 Id. at 1270, 1275.
441 Id. at 1276.
442 Id.
443 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.8.
444 96 Fed. Cl. 258 (2010).
445 Id. at 260, 265–66.
446 Id.
447 Id. at 260.
448 Id. at 266 (citation omitted).
449 Id. The court also found that even though the state had authority to act on its own ini-
tiative in commandeering the property, “[i]t is no defense to a charge of authorizing someone
to violate another’s rights that the perpetrator might have done so on his own.” Id.
450 See, e.g., Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 56 P.3d 396, 402 (Or. 2002).
451 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.10 to .11. See generally Del-Rio Drilling Programs,
Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 683, 689–90 (2000).
452 Id.
453 Id.
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then bear constitutional responsibility for any harm to the mineral owner’s estate that
is caused by the interference of the private surface owner.454
A variation of the foreseeable and inevitable consequence test occurs when courts
consider whether the “link” between the harm to the property owner and the govern-
ment action is substantial enough to constitute causation.455 This test looks for a causal
connection between a government action and a plaintiff’s harm when there is an inter-
mediate step or unfulfilled condition precedent in between.456
The causal chain between government action and harm to a property owner can
be broken when there are intermediate steps or conditions precedent to the occurrence
of the harm.457 For example, in Batten v. United States, a federal court denied a tak-
ings claim which had alleged harm caused by dust, noise, and smoke from military
aircraft.458 The court noted the absence of any physical invasion and reiterated that
“damage alone gives courts no power to require compensation.”459 Similarly, a fear of
future harm to a property owner cannot support a takings challenge if the fear does not
induce a present injury.460
A “plaintiff can establish adequate linkage between the government-defendant’s
actions and the harm incurred if the government defendant [(1)] authorized the act that
brought about the taking, and [(2)] the taking was the natural consequence, or cause
of, the government-approved acts.”461 Conversely, government authorization does not
give rise to inverse condemnation when the permission does not compel the private
acts that produce the harm.462 “For example, when a municipality approved a subdivi-
sion plot and the landowner subsequently built a home, the city was not responsible
for the fact that the landowner’s lot frequently flooded because it was built in a swale
that gathered storm water.”463 The government’s authorization did not require the land-
owner to build in the swale, and the landowner’s decision to build was not the natural
consequence of the permission that had been granted.464
“Where the government action alleged to have caused the harm exceeds valid
statutory authority, courts will generally refuse to find the requisite causal connection
between the government-defendant and the harm incurred, and the takings claim
will fail.”465 The determination of causation, then, involves an inquiry into whether
454 Id.
455 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.4.
456 See id. at 10-48.11.
457 Id. at 10-48.12 (footnotes omitted).
458 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
459 Id. at 583.
460 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
461 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.13.
462 Id.
463 Id. (citing State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250 S.W.3d 365, 372–73 (Mo.
2008)).
464 City of Blue Springs, 250 S.W.3d at 371.
465 Id. (citing Bd. Mach., Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 325, 328 (2001) (holding no
regulatory taking occurred when FDA regulates restricted locations of cigarette machines));
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the individual government agents who approved the allegedly harmful action were
authorized to empower the private acts in the first place.466 If the action by the agents
was unauthorized, it may not be attributable to the government-defendant.467 In
Americopters, L.L.C. v. United States,468 the plaintiff brought a takings claim against
the Federal Aviation Administration.469 The question presented was whether a taking
occurs when “the action allegedly causing the taking is within the agency’s authority
but where . . . the individual employees performing the action were not authorized to
act.”470 This differs from cases involving direct action by government officials because
here the action was not within the scope of the actor’s duties as a government agent.471
When an individual employee of a government agency acts in a way that harms
private property, the fact that other officials were authorized to take the same actions
does not bind the agency.472 Thus, the inquiry becomes: “[W]ere those particular
individual government agents acting within the scope of their authority?”473 This test
is similar to one that might apply in disputes in which individuals are contracting with
the government and unauthorized promises or representations made by a govern-
ment official are not binding on the government.474
A court will review the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s taking claim only
(1) if the government-defendant is unable to prove that the actor’s conduct, taken
on behalf of the government, was unauthorized,475 (2) if the harm was caused by third
party actions not under the control of the defendant,476 or (3) if the government’s ac-
tions were not a substantial cause of the plaintiff’s harm.477 Although proof of a causal
A-1 Cigarette Vending, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 345, 351 (2001) (holding that no
valid takings claim arose simply because the FDA’s regulation of cigarette vending machines
exceeded valid statutory authority); A-1 Amusement Co. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 63,
65–66 (2000) (same).
466 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.
467 Id.
468 95 Fed. Cl. 224 (2010).
469 Id. at 225.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 232–33.
472 See, e.g., id. at 231.
473 Id.
474 The court stated: “In takings, as in contracts, a necessary prerequisite is that the govern-
ment itself has acted.” Id. at 232 (citation omitted).
475 Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that a takings claim could be heard on the merits when federal officials were acting
within the scope of their statutorily authorized duties).
476 See supra notes 420–32 and accompanying text.
477 See LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.3 & n.26 (citing Fruman v. Detroit, 1 F. Supp. 2d
665, 679 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that a decline in market value was caused by government
appraisal of property)); see also Boling v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 674, 680 (1998) (“[I]n
evaluating a takings claim, the actions of the defendant cannot be characterized as unauthorized
merely because they may have been ‘mistaken, imprudent or wrongful’ or even because they
are later found to be ‘contrary to law.’” (citations omitted)); Boling v. United States, 38 Fed.
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link between the government and the plaintiff’s injury permits a reviewing court to
consider whether the defendant’s actions constitute an uncompensated taking, estab-
lishing this link does not mean that a court will necessarily find that the actions violate
the Takings Clause.478 “A causative link between the harm and defendant means only
that the plaintiff has sued the correct defendant; it does not mean that the defendant
has acted unconstitutionally.”479
B. Takings Caused by the Property Owner
A government-defendant to a takings action may point to the plaintiff–property
owner as the true cause of the harm by alleging either that the owner’s actions placed
the property in jeopardy of being taken or that the owner failed to take actions that
would have preserved the property interest.480 If the property owner’s actions are
determined to be the cause of the harm, the takings case against the government-
defendant ends.481
In Rocket Oil & Gas Co. v. Donabar,482 an Oklahoma court quieted title to the
minerals underlying a certain property in favor of an oil and gas company pursuant
to Oklahoma’s Marketable Record Title Act.483 The Act required the trustee’s prede-
cessor in interest to demonstrate an intention to retain minerals by either filing notice
Cl. 705, 709–10 (1997) (holding that Corps of Engineers was the proper defendant because it
constructed a waterway pursuant to a federal statute which resulted in erosion of plaintiff’s
land); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 49 (1994) (holding that the court will address the
merits of a takings claim after the federal government-defendant is unable to show that dimi-
nution in value of the plaintiff’s property was caused by the state of Texas or deed restrictions).
478 See Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 485–86 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the city’s
decisions to (1) rezone a strip of land in the residential area to enable large trucks to access
the warehouse, and (2) grant variance from the municipal noise ordinance did not constitute
a taking of abutting the residential landowners’ property that would entitle the landowners to
compensation when the landowners’ home bordered the industrial area).
479 LAITOS, supra note 33, at 10-48.13 to .14 (citing Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that there was no taking of the plaintiff’s property, even though
the court conceded that the plaintiff’s harm was linked to the federal government, because the
government’s assessment of liability against a bank had caused the bank’s insolvency, which
in turn had harmed the plaintiff (the trustee of the bank))); see also A Tumbling-T v. Flood
Control Dist. of Maricopa, 217 P.3d 1220, 1231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that even though
the negligence claim was successful against the district in showing damage from flooding due
to the district’s clearing of land, there was no “substantial interference” with the property rights
of the farmers to constitute a taking).
480 FDIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 699 (5th Cir. 1991) (“This is not a taking that deserves
compensation because the taking is a consequence of his own failure to have his agreements
written and part of the bank records.”).
481 Id. at 699.
482 127 P.3d 625 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
483 Id. at 634; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 71 (West 2001).
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or being in continuous possession within a reasonable time.484 The defendant-trustee
failed to take such action and, after losing interest in the property, claimed that the
Act constituted a taking by the government because it deprived the trustee of a vested
estate.485 After noting that “persons owning property within a state are charged with
knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such
property,” the court held that “[i]t [was] the owner’s failure to make any use of the
property—and not the action of the State—that cause[d] the lapse of the property right;
there [was] no ‘taking’ that require[d] compensation.”486
In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,487 there was no taking because the
plaintiff assumed the risk of future regulation.488 When employers voluntarily nego-
tiated and maintained pension plans within the strictures of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, the imposition of withdrawal liability as a part of an overall stat-
utory scheme to safeguard the solvency of private pension plans was not considered a
taking.489 The Court stated:
But appellants’ submission—that such a statutory liability to a
private party always constitutes an uncompensated taking pro-
hibited by the Fifth Amendment—if accepted, would prove too
much. In the course of regulating commercial and other human
affairs, Congress routinely creates burdens for some that directly
benefit others. For example, Congress may set minimum wages,
control prices, or create causes of action that did not previously
exist. Given the propriety of the governmental power to regulate,
it cannot be said that the Taking Clause is violated whenever leg-
islation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit
of another.490
Under an assumption of risk theory, a regulation that confirms preexisting limita-
tions on an owner’s property does not necessarily constitute a taking.491 However, if
the regulation imposes restrictions on the land that were not in place when the plaintiff–
property owner received its interest in the property, the government may be required
484 Rocket Oil & Gas, 127 P.3d at 635, 637–38.
485 Id. at 637.
486 Id. at 636; accord United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 103–10 (1985).
487 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
488 Id. at 224.
489 Id.
490 Id. at 222–23.
491 See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“If the regulation pre-
vents what would or legally could have been a nuisance, then no taking occurred. The state
merely acted to protect the public under its inherent police powers.”).
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to compensate the property owner.492 The Supreme Court emphasized this principle in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.493 The plaintiff in Lucas purchased two resi-
dential lots on which he planned to build homes.494 When the state imposed restrictions
on the land that prohibited the plaintiff from building any permanent residential struc-
tures, the plaintiff initiated a claim for just compensation.495 The Court noted that an
acceptable defense for a government-defendant in a takings case is to point to common
law principles that would have prevented the construction of homes on the plaintiff’s
land as a matter of state law.496 To defeat a takings claim, the government-defendant
“must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the
uses [plaintiff] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found.”497 Conversely, if a state transforms private property into public property, it
may not avoid paying just compensation by merely “proffer[ing] the legislature’s dec-
laration that the uses [plaintiff] desires are inconsistent with the public interest.”498
C. Takings Caused by Acts of Nature or Normal Market Forces
Sometimes the harm to a plaintiff–property owner is not attributable to the
government-defendant, and is instead due to acts of nature or the market. In such
cases, courts consider whether the government actor is the proximate cause of the
harm.499 The proximate cause inquiry is similar to the issue raised in the Federal
Circuit regarding whether there is sufficient causative connection for an act to be con-
sidered a taking.500 Proximate cause will be found if there is a natural, continuous, un-
interrupted sequence between the government-defendant’s actions and the harm to the
plaintiff’s property.501 Difficulties may arise when the plaintiff’s damages are due to
a combination of government acts and natural or market forces. In such cases, some
courts require a plaintiff–property owner to show that the government-defendant’s
action was a “substantial concurring cause” of the harm.502 However, when the
492 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992).
493 Id.
494 Id. at 1006–07.
495 Id. at 1007–09.
496 Id. at 1031.
497 Id.
498 Id.
499 Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1407–08, 1413–14 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Smith v.
United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 430, 436, 439–40 (1988). “The . . . issue is whether plaintiff has
satisfied the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Smithland Locks
and Dam is the direct and proximate cause of the erosion damage on Smith’s property.” Smith,
28 Fed. Cl. at 436.
500 See supra notes 318–68 and accompanying text.
501 Smith, 28 Fed. Cl. at 436, 439.
502 See Aikens v. Cnty. of Ventura, No. B221992, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4986, at
*4–5 (Ct. App. June 30, 2011).
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government is only an indirect cause of the harm, the plaintiff risks a court characteriz-
ing such an action not as a taking but as, at most, a tort.503
The question of whether the government can be held liable for a taking in the con-
text of a natural catastrophe arose in Teegarden v. United States,504 in which federal
officials responded to a raging forest fire.505 In just a few hours, the fire consumed over
1,000 acres of land despite federal suppression efforts.506 Timber and other environ-
mental resources on the plaintiffs’ property were destroyed, and the plaintiffs brought
a takings action against the United States to recover compensation for their loss.507 The
plaintiffs claimed that “the concentration of fire suppression manpower and equipment
in areas of high priority [which did not include plaintiffs’ land] manifested ‘an intent
on the part of the defendant to do an act the natural consequence of which was to take
[plaintiffs’] property.’”508 They also argued that the spread of the fire was a “direct,
probable, and foreseeable consequence” of the government’s action.509 However, the
court pointed out that it was the fire, not the federal officials, that caused the destruc-
tion of plaintiffs’ property.510 “In the context of a claim for inverse condemnation,
damages resulting from ‘a random event induced more by an extraordinary natural
phenomenon than by Government interference’ cannot rise to the level of a compen-
sable taking, ‘even if there is permanent damage to property partially attributable to
Government activity.’”511
D. Takings Caused by a Third Party
The state action doctrine requires that a plaintiff bringing a constitutional claim
must sue a government actor.512 When a government-defendant to a takings action al-
leges that the taking was caused not by a government actor, but by a private third party,
the reviewing court must undertake what is in effect a state action analysis to determine
whether the claim can proceed.513 By contrast, if the government-defendant alleges that
the taking was caused by a different government actor, the court must consider which
of the two government entities was responsible for the harm to the plaintiff–property
owner.514 When a government-defendant points to another government actor, the courts
503 See Teegarden v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 252, 256 (1998).
504 Id. at 256–57.
505 Id. at 253–54.
506 Id. at 253.
507 Id. at 254.
508 Id. at 257.
509 Id. at 256.
510 Id. at 257.
511 Id.
512 See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); Cary v. United States, 79
Fed. Cl. 145, 148 (2007).
513 Halverson v. Skagit Cnty., 983 P.2d 643, 647–50 (Wash. 1999).
514 See Cary, 79 Fed. Cl. at 147.
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tend to adopt the same proximate cause test used when deciding if acts of nature or
market forces are responsible—the inquiry becomes, which government actor is the
proximate cause of the harm?515
For example, the Supreme Court of Washington found that the government defen-
dant in Halverson v. Skagit County516 did not effect a taking, because it was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ alleged harm.517 In Halverson, levees constructed by
a diking district—an independent corporation separate and distinct from the county—
caused flooding of the plaintiffs’ land.518 Plaintiffs sought compensation from the
county because the county had provided assistance with the maintenance, repair, and
improvement of the levee system.519 However, the flooding was caused by the levees
constructed by the district, which meant that the county’s action was not the actual or
proximate cause of the flooding.520 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to
hold the county liable under a theory of joint and several liability.521
V. A PROPOSED COHERENT FRAMEWORK WHEN CHOOSING A DEFENDANT IN
TAKINGS CASES
A. Towards a More Predictable Causation Test
Although the purposes underlying the tort system and the takings clause differ
in many respects, tort and takings claims do share some significant characteristics.
One of the primary purposes of common law tort theory is to ensure that an injuring
party will repair or compensate for the losses caused by the party’s wrongful conduct.522
Similarly, one of the aims of the Takings Clause is to prevent state actors from avoiding
constitutional liability for just compensation for their actions when the police power
is being exercised to advance the public interest.523 Both tort and takings claims are
methods to provide economic relief to parties injured by the actions of others.524 Each
can be used to prevent the choices of government or market actors from being forced
515 Halverson, 983 P.2d at 650; see also Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.3d
1177, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that federal officials were not the cause of harm
resulting from state-imposed restrictions on intrastate sales).
516 983 P.2d at 649–50.
517 Id. at 648–49 (“Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is fatally flawed by the total lack of evidence
of proximate cause.”).
518 Id. at 646.
519 Id.
520 Id. at 650.
521 Id. at 649–50.
522 See, e.g., Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 319 (N.J. 1987).
523 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1053 (Leon
Friedman et al. eds., 1971).
524 See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1992); Hedstrom Lumber Co. v.
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 16, 27–28 (1984).
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upon unwilling individuals. Another purpose that tort theory and takings jurisprudence
have in common is to discourage conduct that society deems wrongful.525
The law of takings and the law of property torts also share a common origin—the
English common law of property.526 Judges deciding causation issues in takings actions
often highlight this historical connection between torts and takings.527 Tort concepts
such as trespass and nuisance are frequently used to define the scope of property rights
that are protected by the takings clause.528
This relatedness between tort and takings has been recognized by reviewing courts,
which acknowledge that the same set of facts can give rise to both a taking and one
or more causes of action sounding in tort.529 The Claims Court has noted that “[w]hile
not all torts are takings, every taking that involves invasion or destruction of property
is by definition tortious.”530 The Court of Claims has also surmised that the same en-
croachment on property that constitutes a taking if committed by the government, con-
stitutes a tort if committed by a private party.531 In Beverly v. United States,532 which
involved the trespass of a helicopter over plaintiffs’ land,533 the Court of Claims noted:
Granted, it is possible that these facts could, upon election, sep-
arately support both a taking and a negligence claim; neverthe-
less, the mere fact that Congress decided to lodge jurisdiction over
such claims in different courts does not necessarily mean that they
are separate claims to the extent of overcoming an allegation of
res judicata.534
The similar purposes and common origin underlying tort law and the Takings
Clause support the inference that factual and proximate causation, which are required
525 For a typology of tort theories, see IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW
1–83 (1993).
526 See Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 98 (2005) (citing MORTON J. HOROWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 74 (1977) (“‘With almost complete
unanimity,’ American courts before the Civil War echo Blackstone on property.”)); C.G.
TIEDEMANN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES
ch. x (Da Capo Press 1971) (1886).
527 See, e.g., Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 98–102 (discussing how takings jurisprudence shares
common roots with traditional tort concepts).
528 Id. at 79–80.
529 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“That the complaint suggests the United States may have acted tortuously towards the appel-
lants does not remove it from the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”); Hansen, 65
Fed. Cl. at 101; Clark v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 220, 222–23 (1990).
530 Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 101.
531 Id.
532 24 Cl. Ct. 197, 201 (1991).
533 Id. at 198.
534 Id. at 201 (first emphasis added).
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to prove a tort claim, are also necessary for takings claims.535 Factual causation asks
whether a particular harm would have occurred but for a party’s actions, or in a case in-
volving more than one potential cause, whether a party’s actions were a substantial fac-
tor in causing a particular harm.536 Proximate causation asks whether a particular harm
is too remote from a party’s actions—too far down the chain of factual causation—
to justify imposing liability.537 By ensuring that a defendant will be held liable for
harm that its wrongful conduct causes, courts have discouraged conduct that society
deems wrongful.538
However, factual causation alone is not enough to establish liability under either
a tort or a takings claim.539 The policies that support imposing legal limits on factual
causation in tort law also apply under the Takings Clause; liability should be triggered
only when the harm is foreseeable; otherwise, the scope of factual causation would be
limitless.540 If, in an action alleging either a tort or a taking, a particular defendant is
not the factual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm, then a court cannot justifi-
ably hold that defendant responsible for the harm.541 Moreover, the principle that every
taking is, by definition, tortious necessarily implies that at least the minimum standard
of causation that suffices to support a tort claim should be required to prove a taking.542
A multitude of different approaches to causation may be witnessed in the judicial
decisions involving takings claims arising under all five factual variations discussed
above.543 Yet, these different approaches to causation are all just different ways of im-
plementing the same policy: a government-defendant should be liable for harm that
is caused by its actions but should not have to provide just compensation under the
Takings Clause, or damages pursuant to a tort claim, for either the unforeseeable re-
sults or the foreseeable but merely incidental or consequential results of its actions.544
This principle, requiring both foreseeability and non-incidental injury, is reflected
in two cases from the Federal Circuit. In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United
States,545 for example, there was no taking when a dam built by the government led
to flooding of the plaintiff’s land.546 The flooding eventually resulted in the destruc-
tion of valuable trees on the land.547 Although it was conceivably foreseeable that a
flood might cause damage to trees on the flooded land, the injury was only indirect
535 See id. at 96.
536 Id. at 102.
537 Id.
538 See, e.g., Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 309 (N.J. 1987).
539 Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 104 (2005).
540 Id. at 110.
541 See id. at 104.
542 See id. at 102–03.
543 See supra notes 166–253 and accompanying text.
544 Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 110, 119–20.
545 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
546 Id. at 1367.
547 Id.
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and consequential and was therefore not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.548
Likewise, in George Family Trust v. United States,549 a landowner failed to show that
the flooding of its crop-land was the direct, natural, probable, or foreseeable result of
the operation of upstream dams by the Army Corps of Engineers.550 The landowner
could only prove incidental or consequential injury from the government’s action,
which did not rise to the level of a taking caused by a federal defendant.551
Federal and state courts generally accept the concept that tort-like causation is
required to hold a government-defendant liable for a taking.552 However, courts con-
tinue to struggle with the role that foreseeability and predictability should play in
that causation analysis.553 Some courts apply a standard of causation for takings that
focuses on factual causation while disregarding foreseeability of harm.554 The absence
of foreseeability almost invokes concepts of strict liability.555 On the other hand, as the
Hansen court suggested, foreseeability is sometimes “misappli[ed] . . . in a causation
analysis . . . [because of] the proximity of subjective foreseeability and intent in the
implied contract analysis that prevailed in the Court of Claims for so long.”556 A cau-
sation analysis then becomes confused with ascertaining the subjective state of mind
of the government-defendant.557 A better test permits a reviewing court to consider the
specific knowledge of the government-defendant while not requiring subjective fore-
sight of injury.
The Ridge Line test, which applies when government action allegedly causes harm
to a plaintiff, requires a plaintiff’s harm to be the “predictable result” of the govern-
ment action.558 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit points out the subtle dis-
tinction that Ridge Line makes between a predictable cause and a predictable result:
“[C]ausation must be shown. . . . However, proof of causation, while necessary, is not
sufficient for liability in an inverse condemnation case. . . . In addition to causation, an
inverse condemnation plaintiff must prove that the government should have predicted
or foreseen the resulting injury.”559
548 Id. at 1374–75.
549 97 Fed. Cl. 625 (2011).
550 Id. at 635.
551 Id.
552 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1376.
553 See supra notes 347–68, 383–88 and accompanying text.
554 See Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. City of Palo Alto, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503,
509 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[W]hether or not the [harm] was foreseeable is completely irrelevant
in determining if the City is liable under a theory of inverse condemnation.”).
555 See, e.g., Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 557 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
556 Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 115 (2005).
557 See id.
558 Id. at 117 (citations omitted).
559 Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Banks v. United
States, 69 Fed. Cl. 206, 212 (2006) (citing Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346,
1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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It should not be enough for the government action to be a factual cause of the
plaintiff’s harm. The harm should also have to be a direct result of the government’s
action, and it must have in some way been foreseeable by the government defendant.
The foreseeable or predictable result standard from Ridge Line requires that:
[A] property owner must prove that the asserted government
invasion of property interests allegedly effecting a taking “was
the predictable result of the government action,” either because
it was the “direct or necessary result” of the act or because it was
“within contemplation of or reasonably to be anticipated by the
government.”560
Foreseeability is a more easily measured objective standard, whereas subjective
foresight of injury is difficult, if not impossible, to prove and should not be required.561
The foreseeability test should be applied as it is in tort—an injury that amounts to a
taking may not be foreseeable if an intervening cause breaks the chain of causation.562
Intervening causes are also more easily identifiable by government-defendants, who
may then offer evidence to a court of their existence as part of an argument refuting
foreseeability.563
B. A New Two-Part Analytical Framework for Deciding if the Defendant Is
Responsible for the Taking
Judges and litigants will benefit from a new approach to deciding defendant-
causation issues in takings claims that separates the causation analysis from the tort/
takings analysis. Such a framework applies the Ridge Line standard that begins with
an independent consideration of causation,564 and only when that inquiry is satisfied
does it consider the question of whether the claim should lie in tort or as a taking.565
A takings claim may fail because the government-defendant in the lawsuit does not
meet either the causation requirement566 or the heightened “predictable result” stan-
dard of the tort/takings distinction test.567 However, it may be possible for a tort claim
to exist when factual and proximate causation are satisfied, but the “predictable result”
standard is not.568 This test for deciding causation and tort/takings distinction issues
560 Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
561 See Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232, 235 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
562 See Nicholson v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 605, 617–18 (2007).
563 Id. (discussing the unforeseeability of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation).
564 Id. at 617.
565 Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
566 Nicholson, 77 Fed. Cl. at 618.
567 Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
568 See Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1356.
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can be applied in all of the factual variants that commonly give rise to causation issues
in takings claims.
First, a reviewing court should determine whether the government-defendant is the
factual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm. Addressing this threshold
causation standard before turning to the tort/takings issue will avoid needless litigation,
resolve the state action issue, and ensure that the plaintiff has in fact sued the correct
defendant. It also prevents a court from mistakenly misapplying the foreseeability re-
quirement in an inappropriately subjective manner, because traditional proximate cau-
sation analysis does not consider a defendant’s actual knowledge. To satisfy this first
prong, the plaintiff is required to show that but for the defendant’s wrongful action,
the harm would not have occurred. The plaintiff must also prove that the harm was an
objectively foreseeable consequence of the initial act that eventually resulted in the
harm.569 Proof of this class of causation alone will not ensure that the government en-
tity will ultimately be found to have effectuated a taking, but if it is not proved the
claim will be dismissed.
Only if causation is established will the court turn to the second issue—whether the
government-defendant is responsible for a taking or whether the claim should instead
be brought as a tort. To establish a claim against a government actor for just compen-
sation under the Takings Clause, a plaintiff will have to show that the harm caused by
the government-defendant was the predictable result of the allegedly wrongful action
and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action.570 This require-
ment is essentially the “direct, natural, or probable result” standard from Ridge Line.571
To prove that the harm was a predictable result of the government-defendant’s action,
a plaintiff must establish at least one of the following factors: (1) the government-
defendant intended to cause the harm, or (2) the action adversely affecting the plaintiff
was within the contemplation of—or should have been anticipated by—the government
and was not an incidental or mere consequential injury brought about by the initial
government action.572 If the harm was a direct or necessary result of the government-
defendant’s act, then it satisfies the second prong of the two-pronged test. If a plaintiff
is unable to prove either of the two factors under the predictable result test, then the re-
viewing court may not consider the substantive merits of the takings claim. In this situ-
ation, the plaintiff must decide whether the facts give rise to a claim sounding in tort.
If a plaintiff is able to establish causation and show that its harm was a foreseeable
result of the government-defendant’s action, then the court will consider the underlying
569 See Nicholson, 77 Fed. Cl. at 617.
570 See Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1355.
571 Id.
572 Generally, a “consequential injury” is a loss that results other than in the ordinary course
of events. A direct injury is one that is the direct, natural, or probable result of the initial act,
as opposed to an injury that stems from the harm caused by the initial act. Section 454 of the
Restatement 2nd of Torts defines consequential injury as “[t]he harm additional to that which
is necessary to make the actor’s negligence actionable . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 454 (1965).
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substantive issue of a takings claim—whether the nature and magnitude of the govern-
ment action is substantial enough to warrant a lawsuit under the Constitution for just
compensation. This inquiry triggers the tests announced by the Supreme Court when
a plaintiff has satisfied all the threshold conditions to reaching the merits of whether
the government-defendant has violated the Takings Clause.573
C. Applying the New Framework
This proposal for a new two-tier approach to causation issues in takings actions
not only enables courts to separate the causation analysis from the predictable result
analysis, but also promotes a takings jurisprudence that is consistent with prior judicial
decisions under each of the five factual situations considered above.574 When the issue
is whether government action was involved in the plaintiff’s injury to an extent suffi-
cient to establish a taking, the two-tier framework provides a predictable and coherent
approach to the court’s causation analysis. The new framework consolidates a multi-
tude of varying considerations into one streamlined test.
For example, in Dunn v. City of Milwaukie,575 intent was required to establish lia-
bility for inverse condemnation.576 The government-defendant focused on disproving
intent and argued that the plaintiff’s harm was an unusual and extraordinary result of
the government act.577 However, the court had to infer intent after first finding that the
plaintiff’s harm was a necessary result of the government’s actions.578 Under the pro-
posed framework, the court would have reached the same conclusion with one less
step—regardless of intent, there would be a taking because the plaintiff’s harm was
a necessary, and thus predictable, result of the defendant’s action.
In cases involving potential multiple causes, the court’s analysis must differ
slightly. When a third party is involved, the analysis begins with a consideration of
whether the government-defendant’s act caused the act of the third party, which ulti-
mately resulted in the harm.579 This inquiry requires a dual consideration under the
first tier of the proposed framework: first, whether the government-defendant caused
the third party’s action, and second, whether the third party’s action in turn caused the
plaintiff’s harm. If the government-defendant did cause the third party’s action, then
the state action doctrine is presumably satisfied580 and the plaintiff has chosen to sue
the proper defendant.581 However, the plaintiff must still show that the government’s
573 See supra notes 48–83 and accompanying text.
574 See supra notes 166–267 and accompanying text.
575 250 P.3d 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
576 Id. at 9.
577 Id. at 9–11.
578 Id. at 10–11.
579 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Comm’r of Ins., 84 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1996).
580 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982).
581 See supra notes 268, 393–94 and accompanying text.
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initial action was a proximate cause of the harm.582 Then, even if the plaintiff estab-
lishes that the initial government act caused the harm, tier two of the proposed frame-
work would require a showing that the harm was the predictable, foreseeable result
of the government’s action.
When a private party acting pursuant to state or federal law allegedly causes harm
to a plaintiff–property owner, courts look to the relationship between the harm, the
private party, and the law to determine causation.583 Under tort theory, the actions of
a third party are a superseding cause, removing liability from the original tortfeasor,
but only if the actions of the third party were not foreseeable.584 However, every pos-
sible action that a private party might make without exceeding the scope of the gov-
ernment permission is not automatically considered foreseeable.585 Consider Navajo
Nation,586 in which congressional regulation enabled the Hopi tribe to impose a mora-
torium on development of the plaintiff’s land but the actions of the Hopi tribe were not
compelled by government.587 The court declined to hold the government responsible
simply because the Hopi’s actions were within the authority empowering them to affect
the plaintiff’s land.588
On the other hand, when the government acts with the conduct of the third party
specifically in mind, those actions are foreseeable and would not be treated as a super-
seding cause excusing the government from takings liability.589 If the law compelled
the private party’s action, or if the law or regulation was passed contemplating the pre-
cise private action that occurred, the private action may be imputed to the government
actor and the government-defendant could then be treated as having taken the action
itself. This outcome, however, does not imply that the resulting harm was sufficiently
predictable enough to confer liability for a taking. It would simply mean that in these
cases a takings claim could not be defeated for lack of a state actor, and the takings
analysis on the merits would continue.
Courts already apply a proximate cause test when deciding cases in which the
government-defendant argues that the plaintiff’s harm was caused by nature, market
forces, or a third party.590 The suggested analytical framework incorporates this analy-
sis into the first tier causation inquiry. Once a court finds that a government action
is a cause of the plaintiff’s harm, it must next turn to the second tier of our proposed
framework, which requires a tort/takings inquiry.
582 Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 80–81 (2005).
583 See Casa DeCambio Comdiv S.A. de C.V. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 137, 141–42
(2008).
584 See, e.g., Townsend v. Westside Dodge, Inc., 642 So.2d 49, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
585 Navajo Nation v. United States, 631 F.3d 1268, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
586 Id.
587 See id. at 1276.
588 See id.
589 See, e.g., Coles v. Jenkins, 34 F. Supp. 2d 381, 387 (W.D. Va. 1998).
590 See Halverson v. Skagit Cnty., 983 P.2d 643, 648–49 (Wash. 1999).
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CONCLUSION
Causation is a commonly litigated threshold issue to takings claims.591 When
addressing causation issues in takings actions, the question for a reviewing court
becomes: did the government-defendant actually cause the harm to the plaintiff–
property owner, or should some other party be held responsible for the plaintiff’s
injury?592 Although a finding of causation will settle the issue of whether the plain-
tiff has sued the correct defendant,593 before turning to the merits of the takings claim,
a reviewing court must also address the question of whether the facts give rise to a
taking, or rather to a tort.594
Unlike the familiar threshold issues that often command so much attention
from commentators of the Takings Clause—such as ripeness595 and federal court
jurisdiction596—causation issues are still in flux, with multiple tests for different
settings.597 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not explicitly set forth
any particular standard for establishing a causative link between the government-
defendant and the plaintiff’s injury.598 The fact that torts and takings share common
characteristics suggests that a similar standard for causation should apply to both types
of claims. However, the inherent differences between torts and takings suggest that a
test must be developed for distinguishing between the two different causes of action.
Reviewing courts have struggled to find an appropriate standard for analyzing
threshold causation issues599 and tort/takings distinctions.600 This Article is a summary
of the current confused state of the law, and offers a practical, predictable alternative
to provide some coherence to the initial question of whether the plaintiff has sued the
correct defendant and has chosen, as between takings and tort law, the appropriate
cause of action. The proposed new framework streamlines the conflicting causal
standards into one test that may be applied consistently to each of the factual settings
giving rise to takings actions.
591 See, e.g., Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 96 (2005).
592 Halverson, 983 P.2d at 648–49.
593 See Dunn v. City of Milwaukie, 250 P.3d 7, 8 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
594 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
595 See, e.g., Greenbrier v. United States, 193 F.3d 1348, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
596 See, e.g., Duszak v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 518, 519–20 (2008).
597 See Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 96–102 (2005) (discussing the various tort-
taking distinctions the courts have made).
598 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 96–97.
599 See, e.g., CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that
the plaintiff in a takings case may present evidence that it was objectively reasonable for it
to view a statutory prohibition on prepaying a mortgage as the “primary or ‘but for’” cause
of its investment strategies which had forced it to continue it to operate its property as low
income housing).
600 See Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 96–102.
